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“A Common Fate of Discrimination”:
Race-Gender Analogies in Legal and
Historical Perspective
Serena Mayeri
In her classic work Ain’t I a Woman, African-American feminist critic
bell hooks excoriated white feminists for their “ constant comparison[s] of
the plight of ‘women’ and ‘blacks,’”1 charging that such analogies “ support
the exclusion of black women”2 and represent the linguistic expression of a
“ sexist-racist attitude”3 endemic to the women’s liberation movement.
Hooks, writing in the early 1980s, perceived analogies between racial and
sexual oppression—at least as articulated by white women who “ used black
people as metaphors”4—as a quintessentially opportunistic, parasitic, and
marginalizing practice.
Two decades earlier, when civil rights attorney Pauli Murray, already a
veteran of battles against racial and sexual exclusion, was searching for a
means of persuading skeptics that the eradication of “ Jane Crow”  deserved
moral commitment and legal mobilization equivalent to the fight against
“ Jim Crow,”  she had emphasized the “ strikingly similar positions in
American society”  of “ women and Negroes.”5 Invoking the “ parallel and
interrelated”  histories of women’s rights and civil rights movements,
Murray articulated an analogy that superficially resembled the very
comparison hooks would later condemn.
Powerful political and legal imperatives shaped Murray’s decision to
invoke an analogy between race and sex in the early 1960s. In so doing, she
deliberately and self-consciously adopted a long tradition within feminist
advocacy traceable to the genesis of the antebellum woman’s rights struggle
1. BELL HOOKS, AIN’T I A WOMAN 141 (1981).
2. Id. at 140.
3. Id. at 8.
4. Id. at 141.
5. Pauli Murray, Memorandum in Support of Retaining the Amendment to H.R. 7152, Title
VII (Equal Employment Opportunity) To Prohibit Discrimination in Employment Because of Sex
4-5 (Apr. 14, 1964) (Pauli Murray Papers, MC 412, Box 85, Folder 1485, on file with the
Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University).
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in the crucible of antislavery activism. She also acted on the strong legal
impulse to justify the application of old principles to new circumstances
through analogical reasoning. The analogical arguments advanced by
Murray and others would have a profound impact on the development of
antidiscrimination law in both its legislative and its constitutional
incarnations, an impact that continues to be felt today.
As the juxtaposition of hooks’s and Murray’s words suggests, the
political connotations of analogies between race and sex are highly context-
dependent and historically variable. As this Note will show, changing
historical conditions render the legal ramifications of analogical arguments
equally protean, with momentous consequences for both feminism
and antiracism. Following a conceptual introduction to analogical
argumentation and civil rights advocacy in Part I, Part II investigates the
particular historical context of the 1960s in which race-sex analogies
emerged as a central component of modern feminist legal thought. The
transformation of the social meaning and legal consequences of analogical
arguments in 1970s constitutional jurisprudence is the subject of Part III. In
order to suggest the continuing relevance of this history to today’s civil
rights and feminist agendas, Part IV discusses the trajectory of race-gender
analogies in the recent debate over the Violence Against Women Act’s civil
rights remedy. Finally, Part V provides some concluding remarks about the
historical dynamics of analogical arguments.
I. ANALOGICAL ARGUMENTS AND CIVIL RIGHTS ADVOCACY
Analogical arguments, common in legal reasoning generally,6 are a
staple of civil rights advocacy, where established claims of inequality and
injury serve as a template upon which individuals and groups assert new
claims and demand new remedies.7 Analogies have both political and legal
currency: They can inspire empathy and understanding of harms previously
unrecognized, and they may be desirable, if not necessary, in an
adjudicative system based upon fidelity to precedent. Analogical arguments
not only dominate equal protection jurisprudence, but also play a crucial
role in the construction and legitimation of legislative remedies for
discrimination and violence against subordinated groups. In American
6. For discussions of analogical reasoning in the law generally, see Scott Brewer, Exemplary
Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109
HARV. L. REV. 923 (1996); and Cass R. Sunstein, O  Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV.
741 (1993).
7. Janet E. Halley, Gay Rights and Identity Imitation: Issues in the Ethics of Representation,
in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 115, 115 (David Kairys ed., 1998)
(“ [A]dvocates are opportunists looking for a simile.” ). Halley observes that “ asking the
advocates of gay, women’s, or disabled peoples’ rights to give up ‘like race’ similes would be like
asking them to write their speeches and briefs without using the word the.”  Id. at 120.
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antidiscrimination law, race—in particular, the legal response to the
African-American experience of racial subordination—is both the source of
Americans’ political imagination about the nature and scope of equal rights
protection, and the legal baseline against which new rights claims are
measured.8 This Part first examines the structure of analogical arguments in
the civil rights context and then surveys recent critiques of parallel
reasoning about rights. The final Section suggests that a complete
understanding of the dynamics of analogical argumentation requires a
historical inquiry into the particular contexts and changing conditions that
shape the social meanings and legal consequences of these parallels.
A. Forms of Analogical Argument in the Civil Rights Context
Analogical arguments in the civil rights context assume a variety of
forms. Advocates often employ analogies simply to evoke the moral
opprobrium reserved for classic civil rights harms, demanding a normative
commitment to the eradication of a previously unrecognized, or
underrecognized, category of injuries. This first type of claim may be
simply that sexism, like racism, is a moral wrong worthy of condemnation
and corrective action. This persuasive technique is distinguishable from a
second type of analogy, which identifies parallel consequences wrought by
various types of discrimination. For instance, an advocate might argue that
discrimination based on sex, like discrimination based on race,
detrimentally affects the economic well-being of individuals and groups by
unjustly constraining their employment opportunities. A third type of
analogy consists of specific claims about the particular dynamics of
different types of oppression. At the level of specific employment practices,
the manner in which discrimination is effectuated may vary considerably
according to whether the victim is a clerical worker or a factory operative,
black or Asian, white or Latino/a, male or female, gender-conventional or
not, and so forth. Nevertheless, an analogical argument might posit that
stereotypes and prejudices are the common root of both sex- and race-based
workplace discrimination. Such a parallel often leads to a fourth type of
analogy, whereby advocates use existing legal solutions as models for
combating newly recognized forms of inequality. For instance, advocates
have argued that violence based upon gender or sexual orientation should
be covered by hate crimes legislation similar or identical to laws that
protect individuals from racially motivated assaults.9
8. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281,
1289 (1991) (“ The African American struggle for social equality . . . has provided the deep
structure, social resonance, and primary referent for legal equality. . . .” ).
9. E.g., Steven Bennett Weisburd & Brian Levin, “On the Basis of Sex”: Recognizing
Gender-Based Bias Crimes, 5 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 21 (1994).
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Analogical reasoning may go beyond direct parallels between various
forms of inequality to engage in more nuanced comparisons that recognize
differences as well as similarities and attempt to determine their moral and
legal significance.10 For instance, an analogical backdrop might facilitate
rather than hinder a determination that while sexual orientation may not be
“ immutable”  like race, lesbians and gay men nevertheless suffer
discrimination worthy of redress. This insight is possible, though, only if
gay rights advocates compare the damaging nature of racial and sexual
oppression rather than the characteristics of targeted groups.11 In other
words, they might argue that although sexual minorities and racial
minorities have different group traits and histories, their subordination is
similar in its grave material and dignitary consequences. Further, a
comparative framework may highlight the need for different remedies in
response to different dynamics of oppression or for synergistic solutions to
overlapping inequalities. Often, however, analogical arguments emphasize
similarities rather than differences and intersections, provoking many of the
critiques described in the next Section.
B. Critiques of Analogical Reasoning About Civil Rights
Notwithstanding the considerable rhetorical and legal power of
analogies as persuasive tools, analogical reasoning gives rise to several
analytic and strategic pitfalls in the civil rights context. First, analogies may
hamper the normative recognition and constrain the substantive definition
of the new harm that advocates hope to establish as worthy of political
attention and legal remedy. As Catharine MacKinnon and others have
argued, rigid adherence to analogical reasoning may preclude the
recognition of inequality and suffering that does not precisely resemble
practices already defined as civil rights injuries.12 Analogies make a
particularly procrustean bed if existing law has incorporated a cramped or
impoverished conception of the scope of the original right.13
10. Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and
Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 373 (“ Considering actual or apparent differences between race and
gender may lead to important insights, which in turn may assist in conceptualizing new
approaches to challenging oppression based on either.” ); see also Kenji Yoshino, Suspect
Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1753,
1780-81 (1996) (arguing that courts have incorporated some sensitivity to similarities and
differences between discrimination against various groups into equal protection jurisprudence).
11. Halley, supra note 7, at 125; see also Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98
HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985) (arguing that discreteness and insularity are not necessarily hallmarks
of political powerlessness, and therefore are inappropriate prerequisites for judicial protection of a
group).
12. MacKinnon, supra note 8, at 1288 (“ [S]exism must be like racism, or nothing can be
done.” ).
13. See id. at 1289-91 (arguing that the model of race discrimination on which sex
discrimination is based is itself flawed); see also Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the
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Second, a number of theorists have contended that analogical
arguments detrimentally affect established civil rights claims. Trina Grillo
and Stephanie Wildman argue that even well-intentioned comparisons
between racism and sexism perpetuate white supremacy by decentering the
experiences of people of color, unfairly appropriating their suffering in a
manner that distorts its unique nature and magnitude and obscures the racial
privilege enjoyed by white women.14 To the extent that new claims garner
weaker political support than older claims, advocates have often worried
that association of the new with the old may undermine the legitimacy of
the established claims.15 In her essay on the use of “ like race”  arguments in
the gay rights context, Janet Halley notes that analogies may also have
detrimental doctrinal consequences for an existing body of law, hardening
and reifying categories that were previously soft and amorphous.16
Furthermore, analogical arguments may inadvertently lead judges to
interpret equality mandates narrowly, in ways that constrict existing
remedies.17
Critics have also emphasized how analogies, by stressing the parallel,
rather than the intersectional, synthetic, and overlapping, aspects of various
forms of inequality, can obscure the experiences of individuals and groups
who suffer discrimination along multiple axes. Kimberlé Crenshaw,18
Law: How “Color Blindness” Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CAL.
L. REV. 77 (2000) (explicating shortcomings of the legal conception of what constitutes race
discrimination).
14. Trina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The
Implication of Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (or Other -Isms), 1991 DUKE
L.J. 397.
15. E.g., AILEEN S. KRADITOR, MEANS AND ENDS IN AMERICAN ABOLITIONISM 60 (1967)
(describing male antislavery advocates’ concern that the inclusion of woman’s rights claims
would undermine the abolitionist platform); Halley, supra note 7, at 128 (identifying “ the
argument that gay civil rights claims should be muted because the stigma attached to same-sex
sexuality, indeed to sexuality, might contaminate civil rights law for other constituencies” ).
16. According to Halley,
[w]hen gay rights advocates began to invoke the “ immutable characteristic”  simile,
they were working from a set of scattered, sketchy rationales occurring at happenstance
in the race and sex discrimination cases. By translating these immutable characteristic
references into an indicia of suspectness checklist and implying that its items were not
merely sufficient but necessary conditions for heightened judicial protection, they
invited judges to harden up the law in this area. Judges did just that . . . .
Halley, supra note 7, at 138.
17. E.g., L. Camille Hébert, Analogizing Race and Sex in Workplace Harassment Claims, 58
OHIO ST. L.J. 819 (1997) (arguing that narrow judicial conceptions of sexual harassment have
constrained the scope of actionable hostile environment racial harassment claims); cf. Halley,
supra note 7, at 130 (noting that the Supreme Court’s decision in the gay rights case Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 194 (1986), “ so deeply undermined the foundation”  of Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973), that women’s rights advocates “ seriously faced the possibility that the Supreme
Court could overturn it” ).
18. Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 139 [hereinafter Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection]; Kimberlé Crenshaw,
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Angela Harris,19 Regina Austin,20 and other intersectionality theorists have
exposed the tendency of antiracist and feminist discourses to ignore and
erase women of color by imagining men as the quintessential targets of race
discrimination, and white women as the classic sex discrimination victims.
Nonlegal scholars and critics, including bell hooks,21 Deborah King,22 and
Elizabeth Spelman,23 identify race-sex analogies as a central manifestation
of this phenomenon within the modern feminist movement.24 Others, like
Paulette Caldwell, endorse the careful use of analogical reasoning, but
caution that an emphasis on the similarities and differences between race
and sex discrimination often obscures their inextricable links in the
experiences of women of color.25
Civil rights analogies have garnered criticism for their strategic
drawbacks as well as their descriptive or analytic disadvantages. In a
conservative climate where existing civil rights protections are under siege,
analogies may become decidedly less attractive to advocates. For instance,
after the Supreme Court’s decision in Adarand Constructors v. Pena26 to
apply strict scrutiny to all racial classifications, including affirmative action
programs, parallels to race lost some of their currency.27 Advocates have
also identified analogical reasoning as a tool of retrenchment whereby
opponents of civil rights expansion seize upon differences between new and
established claims to argue that any discrepancy between new and old
Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color,
43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991).
19. Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581
(1990).
20. Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 539. On the shortcomings of
antidiscrimination law’s response to the oppression of women of color, see also MacKinnon,
supra note 8, at 1291.
21. HOOKS, supra note 1.
22. Deborah K. King, Multiple Jeopardy, Multiple Consciousness: The Context of a Black
Feminist Ideology, 14 SIGNS 42, 43-46 (1988).
23. ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST
THOUGHT 119-25 (1988).
24. For critiques of analogies between race and sexual orientation for their occlusion of gay
men and lesbians of color, see Devon W. Carbado, Black Rights, Gay Rights, Civil Rights, 47
UCLA L. REV. 1467, 1469-1505 (2000); and Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen: A
Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory and Political Discourse, 29 CONN. L. REV.
561, 583-84, 631-33 (1997). For more optimistic perspectives on the possibilities for fruitful
analogies between race and sexual orientation, see Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Eq al Protection
Analogies—Identity and “Passing”: Race and Sexual Orientation, 13 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J.
65 (1997); and Margaret M. Russell, Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual Rights and “The Civil Rights
Agenda,”  1 AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y REP. 33 (1994).
25. Caldwell, supra note 10, at 373-74; see also Hébert, supra note 17 (analyzing the
advantages and drawbacks of analogies between racial and sexual harassment).
26. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
27. See, e.g., Halley, supra note 7, at 140. But see Brief of Amici Curiae National Women’s
Law Center, et al., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (No. 94-1941) (seeking strict
scrutiny for “ invidious”  gender classifications in a suit to overturn a public military academy’s
male-only admissions policy); Brief for the Petitioner, Vi ginia, 518 U.S. 515 (same).
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claims presumptively disqualifies the new assertion of rights.28 Opponents
of new rights may also characterize the undesirability of those rights claims
in ways that undermine established claims. For instance, by labeling gay
rights advocates’ quest for protection against discrimination and violence as
a plea for “ special rights,”  foes implicitly denigrate all civil rights laws as
“ special”  favors or preferences.29
C. Analogical Argument as a Historical Phenomenon
These formidable obstacles may lead some theorists and civil rights
advocates to despair of ever utilizing analogies in an effective and inclusive
manner that adequately captures the complexities of various forms of
subordination. But even the severest critics of analogical reasoning usually
acknowledge analogies to be an unavoidable mode of legal argument,30 and
many civil rights advocates still seek to exploit their considerable power.31
Because analogical reasoning has played and continues to play such a
crucial role in the development of civil rights law, the dynamics of
analogical argument are worth exploring further.
To capture these dynamics fully, it is necessary to resist any view of
analogical argumentation as a static, ahistorical phenomenon with a stable
collection of meanings, a consistent set of consequences, or a single moral
28. In the gay rights context, Jane Schacter has labeled this strategy a “ discourse of
equivalents,”  which seeks to undermine civil rights protections for gay men and lesbians by
emphasizing the differences between sexual orientation and other protected categories. Jane S.
Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the Discourse of Equivalents, 29
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 283, 285 (1994).
29. Halley, supra note 7, at 134-36; Schacter, supra note 28, at 293-94.
30. E.g., Carbado, supra note 24, at 1503 (“ [C]omparing race to sexual orientation is [not]
always inappropriate.” ); Halley, supra note 7, at 120 (“ [A]nalogies are probably an inescapable
mode of human inquiry and are certainly so deeply ingrained in the logics of American
adjudication that any proposal to do without them altogether would be boldly utopian.” ); Darryl
Lenard Hutchinson, “Gay Rights for Gay Whites”?: Race, Sexual Identity, and Equal Protection
Discourse, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1358 (2000) (arguing that although race-sexuality analogies
“ ultimately . . . impede[] the quest for gay and lesbian equality,”  id. at 1360, advocates should
nevertheless “ examine why racial subordination and other forms of oppression are undesirable
and injurious,”  id. at 1386-87, and apply those insights to sexual orientation subordination).
31. E.g., Rush, supra note 24, at 72 (arguing that “ analogical reasoning is both valuable and
necessary”  to the gay rights struggle); Russell, upra note 24, at 72-73, 75 (positing the “ need to
reclaim the power of analogy even as we seek to critique and distance ourselves from its
excesses”  in order to “ build on the connections among all kinds of group subordination” ).
Analogical reasoning remains a popular mode of argument in academic literature on civil rights as
well as in courtroom advocacy. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE 153-63 (1996) (likening bans on same-sex marriage to antimiscegenation statutes);
Andrew Koppelman, The Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination, 98 YALE
L.J. 145 (1988) (arguing that laws preventing gay men and lesbians from engaging in sexual
relations are analogous to laws against interracial marriage); Sandra L. Rierson, Race and Gender
Discrimination: A Historical Case for Equal Treatment Under the Fourteenth Amendment,
1 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 89 (1994) (contending that because of historical similarities
between race and gender discrimination, both should receive strict scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause).
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essence. Rather, analogical reasoning is part of a historical process—a
mode of advocacy whose normative valence, substantive content, and
practical effects on rights discourse are variable and highly context-
dependent. The meanings and consequences of analogical argumentation
are closely tied to the historical context in which the analogies are invoked,
the motivations, agendas, and intellectual influences of those who are
invoking them, the reception they receive, and the responses they provoke.
Furthermore, changing historical conditions transform the meanings and
consequences of analogical arguments in ways their originators may not
anticipate or desire. After underscoring the historical variability of race-sex
analogies, the next Part attempts to explain the context that produced one of
the first instances of analogical advocacy in the modern civil rights era.
II. ORIGINS OF ANALOGICAL ARGUMENTS IN
MODERN FEMINIST LEGAL THOUGHT
Critics of feminists’ analogical arguments see parallel reasoning as a
parasitic and opportunistic exercise that tends to undermine antiracist goals,
limit feminism’s scope, ignore the interplay of racial and sexual
inequalities, and obscure the experiences of women of color.32 The first
appearances of analogical reasoning in the modern civil rights era reveal a
set of historical circumstances that produced very different meanings for
race-sex analogies. In addition to lending the moral force and strategic
expertise of the civil rights movement to the feminist cause, the race-sex
analogy that emerged in the early 1960s was intended to resolve a
longstanding impasse among feminists over the Equal Rights Amendment
(ERA), to mend divisions between the black civil rights movement and the
women’s movement, and to place African-American women at the center of
an integrated civil rights and feminist strategy.
A. Race-Sex Analogies in Feminist Legal Discourse: Historical Variability
By the early 1960s, race-sex comparisons already boasted a long
history within American feminism. Since the genesis of the antebellum
woman’s movement in Garrisonian abolitionism, parallels between racial
and sexual subordination appeared intermittently in the service of feminist
legal causes from marriage reform to suffrage. As the following
illustrations indicate, such comparisons had a wide range of meanings and
consequences for both feminism and antiracism, depending on how
feminists wielded them, and on their contemporary political reception.
32. E.g., HOOKS, supra note 1; SPELMAN, supra note 23; King, supra note 22.
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During the antebellum period, woman’s rights advocates invoked
similarities in the legal status of married white women and slaves in order
both to attract white Northern women to abolitionism and to alert them to
their own subordination.33 Feminist abolitionists faced considerable
opposition from antislavery men who were reluctant to grant power to
female activists and fearful that any association with the cause of woman’s
rights would doom their primary objective, the abolition of racial slavery.34
African-American women and men, including former slaves like Sojourner
Truth, often subtly subverted the (white) woman-slave comparison by
telling their own unparalleled stories of suffering and strength.35
Meanwhile, pro-slavery apologists exploited the analogy for their own
purposes. Stripped of the underlying assumption that slavery was wrong,
comparisons between marriage and slavery had long been used to legitimate
both white dominion over blacks and male domination of women as natural,
divinely sanctioned inequalities.36 In the antebellum period, then, analogies
between sexual and racial subordination tended to strengthen the white
woman’s movement, divide white abolitionists, obscure black women’s
plight, and bolster proslavery rhetoric.
After the Civil War, the principles embodied in the Reconstruction
Amendments proved an enticing template to gain enfranchisement for
women as well as black men.37 For a short time in the 1860s, feminists and
abolitionists united behind the American Equal Rights Association to
promote universal suffrage for African-American men and all women, and
made freedwomen a central symbol of their struggle.38 The unwillingness of
Republican politicians to accept any analogy between black male suffrage
and women’s enfranchisement provoked bitter and lasting divisions
between those who felt compelled to ensure black male enfranchisement
even if woman suffrage was not forthcoming, and those who believed
abolitionists should oppose anything short of universal suffrage.39
Moreover, beginning in the late 1860s, some white woman suffragists
turned to racist and nativist arguments in support of their cause,
33. On the relationship between feminism and abolitionism in the United States, see ANGELA
Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE, AND CLASS 33-45 (1981); BLANCHE GLASSMAN HERSH, THE
SLAVERY OF SEX: FEMINIST-ABOLITIONISTS IN AMERICA (1978); and JEAN FAGAN YELLIN,
WOMEN & SISTERS: THE ANTISLAVERY FEMINISTS IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1989).
34. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
35. Nell Irvin Painter, Difference, Slavery, and Memory: Sojourner Truth in Feminist
Abolitionism, in THE ABOLITIONIST SISTERHOOD 139, 153 (Jean Fagan Yellin & John C. Van
Horne eds., 1994) (observing that Truth “made her persona as different from the educated white
women who made her famous as they thought it possible to be” ).
36. On proslavery uses of marriage-slavery analogies, see STEPHANIE MCCURRY, MASTERS
OF SMALL WORLDS 208-25 (1995).
37. ELLEN CAROL DUBOIS, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE: THE EMERGENCE OF AN
INDEPENDENT WOMEN’S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1848-1869, at 54-55 (1978).
38. Id. at 53-78.
39. Id. at 99-104.
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compromising the link between white women’s rights and the struggle for
racial equality.40 In this context, white woman’s rights advocates’ turn away
from analogy signaled the end of an interracial abolitionist-feminist
alliance.
With white feminism complicit in the long post-Reconstruction period
of racial retrenchment, in the 1910s African-American advocates of woman
suffrage used analogies between race and sex to promote female
enfranchisement and advance the cause of universal suffrage. In a typical
formulation, W.E.B. Du Bois declared that depriving women of the suffrage
was “ as unjust as . . . the denial of the right to vote to American
Negroes,”41 while activists such as James Weldon Johnson and Mary
Church Terrell drew parallels between proslavery and antifeminist
ideologies.42 These woman suffragists used analogical arguments both to
resist the racism of the white woman’s movement and to convince African
Americans that white women’s exclusionary tactics made woman suffrage a
no less laudable goal.
Aside from their complex and variable relationship to interracial
politics, the perceived utility of analogical arguments also depended upon
the legal content associated with the racial analogy. In the years between
the winning of woman suffrage and the emergence of the second-wave
feminist movement in the 1960s, analogical arguments were rare. Most
women’s groups opposed the ERA promoted by the National Woman’s
Party (NWP), fearing that the wholesale removal of sex-based distinctions
from the law would endanger protective labor legislation for women.43
Some, noting courts’ restrictive interpretations of the Reconstruction
Amendments, doubted both the feasibility and the utility of applying those
constitutional provisions to women.44 In short, many feminists between
40. DAVIS, supra note 33, at 70-86, 110-36; DUBOIS, supra note 37, at 94-96; PAULA
GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: THE IMPACT OF BLACK WOMEN ON RACE AND SEX IN
AMERICA 123-29 (1984).
41. Votes for Women, 17 CRISIS 8, 8 (Nov. 1917).
42. J.W. Johnson, About Aunties, 10 CRISIS 179, 180 (Aug. 1915) (noting that “ [i]t takes only
a glance to see the striking analogy”  between assertions that “ women are inferior beings”  and
proslavery arguments); Mary Church Terrell, Woman Suffrage and the 15th Amendment, 10
CRISIS 191, 191 (Aug. 1915) (“ [P]recisely the same arguments used to prove that the ballot be
withheld from women are advanced to prove that colored men should not be allowed to vote. The
reasons for repealing the Fifteenth Amendment differ little from the arguments advanced by those
who oppose the enfranchisement of women.” ). For more on African-American advocates of
woman suffrage, see GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE, GENDER AND JIM CROW 211-13 (1996); and
ROSALYN TERBORG-PENN, AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN IN THE STRUGGLE FOR THE VOTE,
1850-1920 (1998).
43. For a typical argument to this effect, see Catherine J. Tilson, The Equal Rights
Amendment to the Federal Constitution—Opposed, 20 CONN. B.J. 66 (1946). For more on
feminists’ post-suffrage ideologies and activities, see NANCY F. COTT, THE GROUNDING OF
MODERN FEMINISM (1987).
44. See, e.g., Tilson, supra note 43, at 68 (stating that “ as everyone knows, many of the
fundamental injustices to the negro [sic] have been held to be unaffected”  by the Fourteenth
Amendment).
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1920 and 1960 associated a racial analogy with the demise of protective
laws and the ineffectual enforcement of equal rights.
Furthermore, the few legal race-sex parallels advanced during this
period were often detached from concerns about racial justice. Though the
NWP intermittently flirted with various legal analogies derived from the
Reconstruction Amendments,45 the group contemplated no partnerships
with nascent race-based civil rights organizations. In fact, even when the
civil rights movement began to make legal strides in the 1950s, the NWP
steadfastly resisted any alliance, electing instead to court the support of
Southern segregationists for their perennial efforts to pass an ERA.46 For
the NWP, analogical arguments seemed a political liability as late as 1963,
when NWP officer Miriam Holden advised her colleagues that successful
passage of the ERA would require them to “ at all costs, avoid comparisons
of our position with the position of the American Negro.”47 Thus, in the
early 1960s, it was far from clear that an analogy to race could gain
acceptance within the feminist community, much less win the approval of
the legal mainstream.
B. The Reemergence of the Race Analogy as Feminist Legal Strategy
The origins of the race-sex analogies presented to legislatures and
courts in the 1960s and 1970s are traceable, in large part, to the activities of
the Committee on Civil and Political Rights of the President’s Commission
on the Status of Women (PCSW), a body convened at the request of
President Kennedy in 1961 to study the position of women in American
45. E.g., Blanche Crozier, Constitutionality of Discrimination Based on Sex, 15 B.U. L. REV.
723 (1935) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment should be applied to discrimination based on
sex as well as race); see also Joan G. Zimmerman, The Jurisprudence of Equality: The Women’s
Minimum Wage, the First Equal Rights Amendment, and Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 1905-
1923, 78 J. AM. HIST. 188, 211-12 (1991) (describing Alice Paul’s early attempts to model the
ERA on the Thirteenth Amendment).
46. E.g., Letter from Alice Paul, Acting Congressional Chairman, National Woman’s Party,
to Mabel Pollitzer, Acting Chairman, South Carolina Branch (Feb. 7, 1955) (National Woman’s
Party Papers, Film Misc 959, Reel 101, on file with the Sterling Memorial Library, Yale
University) (“ You could probably make Governor [Strom] Thurmond see that women are once
again, as after the Civil War, being made to stand aside on the ground that ‘this is the negroes [sic]
hour.’” ); Letter from Helen Paul to Miss [Mary] Brandon, Former Vice Chair, National Woman’s
Party (July 20, 1956) (National Woman’s Party Papers, Film Misc 959, Reel 102, on file with the
Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University) (“ The Southern group [in the Senate] has not ever
been for us but seems now to be galvanized into action probably due to the fact that the
Republicans have been basing their appeal for votes very largely on Civil Rights for negroes
[sic].” ). For more on the NWP’s activities during this period, see LEILA J. RUPP & V ERTA
TAYLOR, SURVIVAL IN THE DOLDRUMS: THE AMERICAN WOMEN’S RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1945
TO THE 1960S (1987).
47. Letter from Miriam Holden to Anita [Pollitzer], Honorary Chairman, National Woman’s
Party (Feb. 16, 1963) (National Woman’s Party Papers, Film Misc 959, Reel 108, on file with the
Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University).
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society.48 It was through her involvement in the PCSW that Pauli Murray, a
veteran civil rights lawyer and activist, pioneered a new strategy for
feminist legal advocacy that relied on the recently revived Fourteenth
Amendment. This Section examines the particular intellectual climate and
historical conditions that made analogical arguments appealing to Murray
and her colleagues on the PCSW.
Notwithstanding the popular ideology of domesticity that had
dominated 1950s gender discourse, a small but significant body of postwar
social science and polemical literature provided scholarly and theoretical
support for the notion that sexism and racism were comparable phenomena.
The moral force and legal successes of the civil rights movement made
analogizing sex to race a promising strategy for the recognition of sexual
inequality as an important moral, political, and legal problem. As a practical
matter, the legal arm of the civil rights movement stood as a powerful
strategic model for attacking sex discrimination through litigation. Further,
the use of the Fourteenth Amendment to combat sex discrimination
promised to circumvent the contentious debate over the ERA that had
divided feminists since the 1920s. Finally, the analogy between race and
sex provided a means of linking movements for racial justice and women’s
rights, movements that had already begun to diverge in damaging and
divisive ways.
1. Jane Crow, a New American Dilemma, and an NAACP for Women
Pauli Murray, an African-American lawyer and civil rights pioneer, was
ideally suited to the task of formulating a strategy that drew both
intellectually and tactically from the racial justice movement. A North
Carolina native, Murray had urged a direct challenge to educational
segregation in the early 1940s and made important contributions to the
NAACP’s litigation strategy in Brown v. Board of Education.49 When
Murray earned top honors at Howard Law School in 1944, an
accomplishment usually rewarded with a prestigious Harvard fellowship,
officials there informed her that, as a woman, she was ineligible for
admission. Murray penned a strongly worded, though unsuccessful, appeal
to the Harvard Corporation and grew more determined to combat the
48. For a thorough account of the PCSW’s activities, see CYNTHIA HARRISON, ON ACCOUNT
OF SEX: THE POLITICS OF WOMEN’S ISSUES, 1945-1968, at 109-68 (1988). The PCSW included
government officials, legislators, labor leaders, representatives of women’s groups, and college
presidents. Id. at 112-13.
49. PAULI MURRAY, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A BLACK ACTIVIST, FEMINIST, LAWYER,
PRIEST, AND POET 254-55 (1987) (discussing Murray’s connection to Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
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phenomenon she termed “ Jane Crow.”50 After fifteen years of law practice,
writing, and activism, Murray was working toward her doctorate at Yale
Law School in 1962 when her expertise in civil rights law made her an
obvious choice to explore alternative legal strategies on behalf of the
PCSW. In a widely circulated memorandum, Murray articulated a race-sex
analogy that would profoundly shape women’s rights advocacy under the
Fourteenth Amendment and through civil rights legislation well into the
1970s and beyond.51
Murray’s memorandum argued that the gravity and nature of women’s
subordination were comparable to racial oppression. Women, like racial
minorities, were “ an easily identifiable group, to a large degree
unrepresented in the formal decision-making processes,”  and their “ legal
history [was] one of slow progress against considerable resistance from the
dominant (male) group.”52 Women’s inferior position, like that of blacks,
was predicated upon supposedly inherent differences, so that “ legal
distinctions based upon sex [were] particularly susceptible”  to applications
prolonging and reinforcing “ women’s inferior status.”53 Murray
emphasized to PCSW members that “ [t]he attributes of sex have obscured
the attributes of humanity in much the same way the attributes of the slave
as property also obscured his attributes as a thinking human being.”54
In addition to calling for an equivalent moral commitment to the
eradication of sex and race discrimination, Murray’s analogy posited
similar causal bases and mechanisms for racial and sexual inequality. To
make the case for operational similarities between racism and sexism,
Murray drew upon a burgeoning postwar social science literature that had
begun to explore parallels between the subordinate status of women and
racial inequality. Eventually, her sources came to include sociologist
Gunnar Myrdal, social psychologist Helen Mayer Hacker, anthropologist
50. Id. at 183, 238-44. Another African-American feminist who would later become an
outspoken lawyer and activist, Florynce Kennedy, was also exploring the parallels between racism
and sexism as a Columbia undergraduate in the mid-1940s. See Florynce Kennedy, A
Comparative Study: Accentuating the Similarities of the Societal Position of Women and Negroes,
reprinted in WORDS OF FIRE: AN ANTHOLOGY OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN FEMINIST THOUGHT 102
(Beverly Guy-Sheftall ed., 1995).
51. For other discussions of the Murray memorandum, see HARRISON, supra note 48, at 126-
34; LINDA K. KERBER, NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES 189-92 (1998); Mary Becker,
The Sixties Shift to Formal Equality and the Courts: An Argument for Pragmatism and Politics,
40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 209, 222-31 (1998); and Rosalind Rosenberg, Pauli Murray and the
Killing of Jane Crow, in FORGOTTEN HEROES 279, 279-87 (Susan Ware ed., 1998).
52. Pauli Murray, A Proposal To Reexamine the Applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment
to State Laws and Practices Which Discriminate on the Basis of Sex Per Se 10 (Dec. 1962)
(PCSW Papers, Doc. II-20, Box 8, Folder 62, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe
Institute, Harvard University).
53. Id.
54. Pauli Murray, Presentation to the PCSW 351 (1962) (transcript available in the Pauli
Murray Papers, MC 412, Box 49, Folder 885, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe
Institute, Harvard University).
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Ashley Montagu, and philosopher Simone de Beauvoir, all of whom wrote
against an older scientific tradition that had treated race and gender as
analogous elements of a “ natural”  hierarchy.55
In her PCSW memo, Murray relied primarily on Myrdal and Hacker to
support her analogical arguments. She utilized Myrdal’s influential 1944
study An American Dilemma for its brief discussion of similarities between
racism and sexism in the six-page appendix entitled “ A Parallel to the
Negro Problem.”56 Myrdal argued that women, like Negroes, were branded
intellectual inferiors, deemed ineducable, confined to certain societal roles,
excluded from many fields of employment, denied citizenship rights, and
mythologized as “ content”  in their subordinate positions.57 Hunter College
Professor Helen Mayer Hacker provided a more detailed portrait of the
social values and practices operating on Negroes and women in her 1951
article “ Women as a Minority Group,”  published in the journal Social
Forces.58 Hacker asserted that both women and Negroes occupied a “ caste-
like”  status, exhibiting tendencies toward self-hatred, an internalization of
the inferiority attributed to them by the dominant society.59 Moreover,
Hacker argued that the dynamics and consequences of racism and sexism
were similar, and enumerated them in detail: the “ high social visibility”  of
both skin color and sex; similar ascribed attributes including intellectual
inferiority, emotional volatility, and lack of sexual self-control;
confinement to low social status and mythologized “ contentment” ;
strategies of accommodation such as a deferential manner, pretension of
ignorance, and methods of “ outwitting”  the dominant group; and finally,
educational, economic, professional, and social discriminations that resulted
in lower occupational attainments.60
In later iterations of her analogical arguments, Murray also drew upon
the work of the controversial and charismatic anthropologist Ashley
Montagu, who published several works in the 1940s and 1950s designed to
demolish myths of racial and sexual inferiority that had long plagued
biology and the social sciences.61 In the widely read Man’s Most Dangerous
55. For more on race-gender analogies in earlier scientific discourse, see CYNTHIA EAGLE
RUSSETT, SEXUAL SCIENCE: THE VICTORIAN CONSTRUCTION OF WOMANHOOD 27-28 (1989);
and Nancy Leys Stepan, Race and Gender: The Role of Analogy in Science, in ANATOMY OF
RACISM 38 (David Theo Goldberg ed., 1990).
56. GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA : THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN
DEMOCRACY app. 5 at 1073 (1944).
57. Id. at 1077.
58. Helen Mayer Hacker, Women as a Minority Group, 30 SOC. FORCES 60 (1951).
59. Id. at 61. Hacker was careful to delineate differences between “ women and Negroes” :
Women “ lack[ed] a sense of group identification,”  depended upon the dominant group (men) for
many aspects of economic and social status, and suffered less overt discrimination. Id. at 62-66.
60. Id. at 65.
61. See sources cited supra note 55.
MAYERIFINAL.DOC MARCH 5, 2001 3/5/01 3:57 PM
2001] Race-Gender Analogies 1059
Myth: The Fallacy of Race,62 first published in 1945, Montagu devoted a
brief chapter to the parallels between antifeminism and race prejudice,
urging his readers to “ recall that almost every one of the arguments used by
the racists to ‘prove’ the inferiority of one or another so-called ‘race’ was
not so long ago used by the antifeminists to ‘prove’ the inferiority of the
female.”63 Murray inverted Montagu’s argument that the “ slackening of
prejudices”  against women led to a concomitant “ increase in the intensity
of prejudices against ethnic and minority groups”  due to the “ displaced
aggression”  of dominant groups in search of a scapegoat.64 Conversely,
Murray warned, white women’s resentment of the attention paid to racial
problems and the perceived neglect of sex discrimination might precipitate
a racial backlash damaging to both the feminist and antiracist causes.65
French philosopher and social commentator Simone de Beauvoir was
also among those who compared racial and sexual subjugation in the
postwar period. In The Second Sex,66 de Beauvoir used comparisons
between women and blacks to highlight the degree to which Western
societies subordinated women, and to lament women’s lack of collective
consciousness. While Negroes and proletarians organized themselves
against an “ other” —be it whites or the bourgeoisie—women did not
“ authentically assume a subjective attitude,”  de Beauvoir complained.67
Nevertheless, she identified “ deep similarities between the situation of the
woman and that of the Negro.”  Both were socialized to submit to the will
of the dominant group rather than asserting their own self-ownership and
efficacy,68 and both deserved the chance to prove themselves, unfettered,
before their worth was adjudged wanting.69 Murray cited de Beauvoir for
her substantive and normative comparison of women and blacks,70 and
implicitly urged her compatriots not to succumb to the inertia of
subordination.
In her PCSW memorandum and other writings, Murray drew upon
these social scientists to argue that the parallels between race and sex
discrimination were numerous, but emphasized that while courts had come
to recognize the evil of the former, they remained nearly blind to the latter’s
scourge. In large part, Murray suggested, the judicial failure to perceive the
62. ASHLEY MONTAGU, MAN’S MOST DANGEROUS MYTH: THE FALLACY OF RACE (4th rev.
ed. 1964) (1945) [hereinafter MONTAGU, MAN’S MOST DANGEROUS MYTH]; see also ASHLEY
MONTAGU, THE NATURAL SUPERIORITY OF WOMEN (1953).
63. MONTAGU, MAN’S MOST DANGEROUS MYTH, supra note 62, at 181.
64. Id. at 183.
65. See infra notes 104, 122.
66. SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (H.M. Parshley ed. & trans., Alfred A. Knopf,
Inc. 1952) (1949).
67. Id. at xliii.
68. Id. at 348.
69. Id. at 750.
70. E.g., Murray, supra note 5, at 6.
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grave harms of sex discrimination was attributable to the lack of a women’s
organization comparable to the NAACP that could spearhead a
multipronged assault on sex discrimination through political advocacy,
public education, legal scholarship, social scientific studies, and, most
importantly, litigation.71 These measures, Murray suggested, could produce
a judicial breakthrough for women comparable to blacks’ achievement in
Brown. For Murray, then, the utility of the race-sex analogy extended
beyond persuading courts of the substantive similarities between the two
forms of discrimination to encompass an institutional and tactical strategy
modeled on the legal arm of the civil rights movement.
2. Beyond the ERA Impasse, Toward Interracial Cooperation
There was another impetus behind Murray’s proposal, one that was
crucial to its acceptance by PCSW members—the desire to move beyond
the contentious wrangling over the ERA that had divided feminists and
reformers since the 1920s. An ERA, opponents feared, would demolish
labor legislation that protected women, as women, from the worst working
conditions. Many labor-oriented reformers were also skeptical, as a matter
of principle, of measures that would eliminate all legal distinctions based on
sex. By early 1963, Murray perceived that the “ controversy over the Equal
Rights Amendment seemed to force people who espoused the same goals
into rigid positions and dissipated energies which might have gone toward a
development of standards for the concept of equal status.”72 Feminists
could circumvent the counterproductive ERA dispute, Murray suggested,
by uniting behind a litigation strategy based upon the Fourteenth
Amendment’s equal protection guarantee.
When Murray proposed the pursuit of women’s rights through
Fourteenth Amendment litigation, committee members sought to reassure
themselves that her strategy would leave protective labor legislation
unharmed.73 For her part, Murray emphasized that the Fourteenth
Amendment approach differed from the ERA in that the former would
71. Murray, supra note 54, at 355; Murray, supra note 52, at 32-34, 36-37.
72. Letter from Pauli Murray to Representative Edith Green 2 (Jan. 24, 1963) (Pauli Murray
Papers, MC 412, Box 49, Folder 878, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute,
Harvard University).
73. E.g., Letter from Katherine P. Ellickson, Executive Secretary, PCSW, to Pauli Murray
(Oct. 4, 1962) (Pauli Murray Papers, MC 412, Box 49, Folder 876, on file with the Schlesinger
Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University) (“ I believe it would be helpful to clarify your
thinking on protective labor legislation. Some people interpreted your remarks as meaning that
you would consider protective labor legislation discriminatory and subject to invalidation under
the Fourteenth Amendment. This is not my understanding of your position . . . .” ); Letter from
Pauli Murray to Katherine P. Ellickson (Oct. 13, 1962) (Pauli Murray Papers, MC 412, Box 49,
Folder 876, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University) (“ First,
let me say that my position on labor legislation protective in nature is that it should not be
disturbed.” ).
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allow the government to protect women to the extent that they performed
certain functions in society, such as childbearing and child-rearing. Murray
suggested that
[w]hat is needed to remove the present ambiguity of women’s legal
status is a shift of emphasis from their class attributes (sex per se)
to their functional attributes and to redelineate the boundaries
between social policies that are genuinely protective of the family
and maternal functions and those which are unjustly discriminatory
against women as individuals.74
She proposed a standard of “ reasonableness,”  under which a policy that
treated women differently would be constitutionally valid if and only if it
was either “ designed to protect the maternal and family functions through
compensatory measures and [was] limited in operation to that class of
women who perform these functions,”  was demonstrably necessary to
protect women’s unique health needs, was “ designed to protect an equality
of right which women, because of their traditionally disadvantaged position
in society, themselves have been unable to assert,”  and did not “ imply
inferiority or enforce an inferior status by singling women out as a class for
restrictive treatment.”75 By declaring that not all sex-based legal
distinctions would be invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment, Murray
clarified to skeptics that the race-sex analogy did not dictate identical
treatment of men and women.
Some remained unconvinced, believing that legitimate differences
between the sexes barred an analogy to race. A representative of the
National Council of Jewish Women (NCJW) pointed to Murray’s
“ attempt[] to equate racial discriminations with discriminations on the basis
of sex”  as the “ one general weakness”  of her memorandum.76 “ As a
philosophical and sociaological [sic] concept it may have some validity,”
the NCJW said of the race-sex parallel, but the group expressed concern
that “ the attempt to equate the two kinds of discrimination carried with it
the implication that differential treatment for women is not acceptable.”77
Others simply did not find the analogy empirically accurate or morally
compelling. Harvard Law School Dean Erwin Griswold wrote Murray a
cordial, if condescending, note praising her “ excellent memorandum”  but
refusing to endorse her conclusions. “ I must confess . . . that I find myself
rather lukewarm about your proposition,”  he admitted. “ [I]t has always
74. Murray, supra note 52, at 8-9.
75. Id. at 17.
76. Statement of Mrs. Samuel Brown, National Council of Jewish Women, Before the Civil
and Political Rights Committee 4 (Mar. 8, 1963) (Pauli Murray Papers, MC 412, Box 49, Folder
883, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University).
77. Id.
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seemed to me that there are differences in sex, and these differences may, in
appropriate cases, be the basis of classification . . . . [Y]our proposal does
seem to me at times to carry a good thing, perhaps a little bit too far.”78 In
response, Murray continued to emphasize that her proposal was not the
functional equivalent of an ERA, but rather retained the flexibility to
remedy sex discrimination without barring legislation designed to benefit
women as a class.
Attacks on the race-sex analogy from the pro-ERA camp highlighted
another central object of Murray’s strategy: uniting the civil rights and
feminist movements at a moment when they threatened to diverge in
damaging and divisive ways. While in its public statements, the ERA-
centered NWP derided the Murray strategy as “ wishful thinking”  and
insisted that an ERA was the only genuine guarantor of women’s equality,79
privately some in the organization suspected Murray of hijacking the
women’s movement on behalf of black civil rights. In a letter circulated to
NWP leaders, Miriam Holden advised against endorsing a race-sex
analogy, and advanced a startling theory to explain the Murray strategy.
Murray’s “ preoccupation,”  she posited, “ is with the Negro problem, and
her primary purpose seems largely to be an attempt to hitch that wagon to
our Equal Rights Amendment star.”80 Such a linkage, Holden worried,
would jeopardize the political viability of an ERA and “ spell disaster for
our hopes,”  for “ [t]he Southern states are sure to look with disfavor on any
Constitutional legislation that is linked with the Negro problem.”81 Oddly,
Holden suggested that the civil rights movement—which by 1963 had
enjoyed success that the NWP could only dream of—was attempting to co-
opt the ERA for its own purposes; she accused the NAACP of conspiring to
“ infiltrate”  the women’s movement and “ make use of it as a springboard
for their own propaganda.”82 It was here that Holden advised her
compatriots to “ at all costs, avoid comparisons of our position with the
position of the American Negro.”83 Holden and others urged the party to
continue courting Southern segregationists in their quest for an ERA.
As Murray was well aware, the hostile stance of these NWP activists
was nothing new. The historical record was replete with cautionary tales
about white feminists’ exclusion of black women and men from their
78. Letter from Erwin N. Griswold, Dean, Harvard Law School, to Pauli Murray 1 (Jan. 31,
1963) (Pauli Murray Papers, MC 412, Box 49, Folder 878, on file with the Schlesinger Library,
Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University).
79. Miriam Y. Holden, Argument in Favor of the Equal Rights Amendment, to the
President’s Commission on the Status of Women (Mar. 23, 1963) (Pauli Murray Papers, MC 412,
Box 49, Folder 883, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University).
80. Letter from Miriam Holden to Anita [Pollitzer], supra note 47.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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agenda. Invoking this history, Murray repeatedly suggested to supporters of
black civil rights that a failure to assuage women’s concerns would be
racially divisive, reenacting the Reconstruction-era demise of the equal
rights alliance.84 In such a scenario, Murray emphasized, black women
would be left without effective means of redress. To audiences of white
women, Murray struck a more positive note, evoking past alliances as
precedent for a renewed joint effort.85 But her message was unmistakable:
She was, as a black woman, unwilling to bear the costs of racial division
within the feminist movement.
Conversely, Murray’s personal experience revealed the potential for
women’s contributions and concerns to be marginalized within the black
civil rights movement. “ Nowhere is there a greater need for appreciation of
the rights of women as citizens than in the Negro community itself,”
Murray wrote in 1962.86 “ Negro women, although they have battled
valiantly for ‘equal rights’ have not always shared those rights when they
were established.”87 Without special attention to sex discrimination,
Murray argued, one-half of black Americans would be left without
protection, fatally hampering racial progress.
3. “A Common Fate of Discrimination”: Murray’s Analogy in the
Title VII Debate
The role of Murray’s race-sex analogy in linking the advancement of
blacks and white women came into even sharper relief during the brief but
contentious debate over the inclusion of “ sex”  as a prohibited basis of
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.88 The
introduction of the Title VII sex amendment by Representative Howard
Smith of Virginia, an avowed opponent of the Civil Rights Act, led some to
later call its passage a mere joke or fluke;89 whatever his nefarious
motivations, women’s rights advocates seized the moment to argue on the
84. See infra notes 104, 118, 122, and accompanying text.
85. E.g., Pauli Murray, Address at the All-Women Conference Sponsored by the National
Council of Women of the United States 4-5 (Oct. 11, 1962) (National Woman’s Party Papers,
Film Misc 959, Reel 107, on file with the Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University).
86. Letter from Pauli Murray to Gertrude Wilson 2 (Aug. 29, 1962) (Pauli Murray Papers,
MC 412, Box 49, Folder 875, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard
University).
87. Id. at 2. For more on links between feminism and women’s participation in the civil rights
movement, see SARA EVANS, PERSONAL POLITICS: THE ROOTS OF WOMEN’S LIBERATION IN THE
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE NEW LEFT (1979); and WOMEN IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT: TRAILBLAZERS AND TORCHBEARERS (Vicki L. Crawford et al. eds, 1990).
88. For other accounts of the Title VII sex amendment debate that discuss Murray’s role, see
HARRISON, supra note 48, at 180-81; MURRAY, supra note 49, at 354-58; and Becker, supra note
51, at 233-35.
89. Jo Freeman, How “Sex” Got into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism as a Maker of Public
Policy, 9 LAW & I NEQ. 163, 164 (1991).
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amendment’s behalf.90 More starkly and publicly than in the controversy
over the PCSW’s Fourteenth Amendment strategy, the racial politics of the
debate over Title VII’s sex provision placed the interests of white women
and African Americans in tension.
When Smith introduced the sex amendment, Representative Emanuel
Celler of New York, a primary sponsor of the Civil Rights Act and a
prominent ERA opponent, immediately rose in opposition to including sex
in the bill. He listed a parade of horribles—compulsory military service, the
decline of traditional family relationships, the invalidation of rape laws and
protective labor legislation—that would follow from the adoption of legal
sex equality.91 Moreover, Celler contended, even if women did experience
some discrimination in employment, their progress toward equality was
rapid compared to that of Negroes.92
Representative Martha Griffiths of Michigan, a longtime advocate of
women’s rights, issued a lengthy rebuttal in which she appealed to her
colleagues not to leave white women unprotected from employment
discrimination. “ I rise in support of the amendment,”  announced Griffiths,
“ because I feel as a white woman when this bill has passed . . . that white
women will be last at the hiring gate.”93 Despite her support for the civil
rights bill, Griffiths did not hesitate to appeal directly to the prejudices of
Southern congressmen, posing several hypotheticals in an attempt to force
Celler to admit that Title VII, sans sex amendment, would cover black but
not white women. “ [Y]ou are going to try to take colored men and colored
women and give them equal employment rights, and down at the bottom of
the list is going to be a white woman with no rights at all,”  she
complained.94 Eager to undermine the race discrimination provisions of
Title VII, Southern legislators jumped on Griffiths’s bandwagon. For
instance, Representative Rivers of South Carolina announced his support
for the amendment “ making it possible for the white Christian woman to
receive the same consideration for employment as the colored woman.”95
Much of the legislators’ rhetoric echoed a 1963 NWP resolution, which had
warned: “ [T]he Civil Rights Bill would not even give protection against
discrimination because of ‘race, color, religion or national origins,’ to a
90. Id. at 172-83.
91. 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964) (statement of Rep. Celler).
92. Id. at 2578.
93. Id. (statement of Rep. Griffiths).
94. Id. at 2579-80. Griffiths continued: “ [W]hen the colored woman shows up and she is
qualified, she is going to have an open entrée into any particular field . . . . [W]hite men have done
this before . . . your greatgrandfathers were willing as prisoners of their own prejudice to permit
ex-slaves to vote but not their own white wives.”  Id.
95. Id. at 2583; see also id. (statement of Rep. Andrews) (“ [T]he white women of this
country would be drastically discriminated against in favor of a Negro woman.” ).
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White Woman, a Woman of the Christian Religion, or a Woman of United
States Origin.” 96
Fearful that the alliance between feminists and Southerners would
derail the entire bill, Representative Edith Green, author of the Equal Pay
Act, PCSW member, and longtime supporter of women’s progress,
professed her opposition to the amendment for fear it would defeat the bill.
Sardonically praising her Southern colleagues for their belated conversion
to the women’s rights cause, she acknowledged that discrimination against
women in employment was an important and serious problem. But at the
risk of being labeled an “ uncle Tom”  or “ aunt Jane,”  as she put it, Green
declared, “ I do not believe this is the time or place for this amendment. For
every discrimination that has been made against a woman in this country
there has been 10 times as much discrimination against the Negro of this
country.”97 The House debate, then, framed the inclusion of sex in Title VII
as a favor to white women that might well undermine the primary purpose
of the bill—to protect African Americans from racial discrimination.
When the sex amendment was in danger of failing in the Senate,
Murray used her race-sex analogy to dispel the impression that the
prohibition of sex discrimination was necessary only as a protection for
white women. In a memorandum circulated among Senators and eventually
reviewed by the White House,98 she insisted that including sex as a
prohibited basis for discrimination was the only way to extend the benefits
of Title VII to the group that most needed them: black women. She
discredited the scenario suggested by Griffiths—that white women would
be “ last at the hiring gate”99 without a sex amendment:
What is more likely to happen . . . [is that] in accordance with the
prevailing patterns of employment both Negro and white women
will share a common fate of discrimination, since it is exceedingly
96. National Woman’s Party Resolution (adopted Dec. 16, 1963) (National Woman’s Party
Papers, Film Misc 959, Reel 108, on file with the Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University),
quoted in Carl M. Brauer, Women Activists, Southern Conservatives, and the Prohibition of Sex
Discrimination in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 49 J. S. HIST. 37, 43 (1983). Some NWP
members went beyond pandering to Southern congressmen and endorsed their racist opposition to
the Civil Rights Act. See Letter from Nina Horton Avery, member, NWP, to Representative J.
Vaughan Gary (D-Va.) (Jan. 8, 1964) (National Woman’s Party Papers, Film Misc 959, Reel 108,
on file with the Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University) (thanking God for the intervention of
politicians “ who will use their brains and energies to prevent a mongrel race in the United States
and who will fight for the rights of white citizens in order that discrimination against them may be
stopped” ), quoted in Brauer, supra, at 43.
97. 110 CONG. REC. 2581 (1964) (statement of Rep. Green); see also id. (“ As much as I hope
the day will come when discrimination will end against women . . . [this amendment] may
later . . . be used to help destroy this section of the bill by some of the very people who today
support it.” )
98. MURRAY, supra note 49, at 357.
99. See supra note 93.
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difficult for a Negro woman to determine whether or not she is
being discriminated against because of race or sex.100
In fact, Murray urged, “ A strong argument can be made for the proposition
that Title VII without the ‘sex’ amendment would benefit Negro males
primarily and thus offer genuine equality of opportunity to only half of the
potential Negro work force.”101 And if white women were excluded on the
grounds that black rights were paramount, their resentment might further
compromise already frayed American race relations. Invoking the post-
Reconstruction suffrage movement split, Murray warned that the “ bitter
memories”  of the previous century’s betrayal made women
“ understandably apprehensive and resentful”  of any attempt to exclude
them from the new equal employment law.102
Murray and Justice Department attorney Mary O. Eastwood also made
the race-sex analogy the opening salvo of their influential 1965 article
“ Jane Crow and the Law,”  which appeared in theG orge Washington
University Law Review.103 Published just as it was becoming clear to
feminists that the EEOC had chosen to all but ignore the sex provision of
Title VII, the “ Jane Crow”  article used a race-sex parallel to highlight the
moral seriousness and economic magnitude of discrimination against
women, and to insist that the eradication of race discrimination was
impossible without the inclusion of black women in employment
protections. Two years later, Murray helped to found the National
Organization for Women (NOW), which was established to spur the
enforcement of Title VII in cases of sex discrimination.104
Murray continued to reiterate her analogical arguments throughout the
1960s, in the face of considerable opposition from both black civil rights
leaders and the predominantly white ACLU staff.105 Murray had been an
early critic of the black civil rights movement’s male-dominated public
100. Murray, supra note 5, at 20.
101. Id. at 20-21.
102. Id. at 12.
103. Pauli Murray & Mary O. Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and
Title VII, 34 GEO. WASH. U. L. REV. 232 (1965). For a contemporaneous rejection of the race-sex
analogy, see Note, Classification on the Basis of Sex and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 50 IOWA L.
REV. 778, 797 (1965).
104. MURRAY, supra note 49, at 365-68; see also Letter from Pauli Murray to Richard
Graham, Commissioner, EEOC 2 (Mar. 28, 1966) (Pauli Murray Papers, MC 412, Box 55, Folder
959, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University) (asserting that
Graham’s statement that the EEOC would give a lower priority to sex discrimination claims
“ implie[d] that Negro males are to be favored over white females and only intensifies an ever
potential ‘backlash’ of racial discrimination,”  repeating the nineteenth-century error). For more
on the founding and early development of NOW, see JO FREEMAN, THE POLITICS OF WOMEN’S
LIBERATION 71-102 (1975); and HARRISON, supra note 48, at 192-209.
105. For more on Murray’s role in the ACLU during the 1960s, see SUSAN M. HARTMANN,
THE OTHER FEMINISTS: ACTIVISTS IN THE LIBERAL ESTABLISHMENT 52-81 (1998).
MAYERIFINAL.DOC MARCH 5, 2001 3/5/01 3:57 PM
2001] Race-Gender Analogies 1067
face,106 and grew increasingly concerned about the repression of female
voices as the Black Power movement gained momentum in the mid-1960s.
When the Congress on Racial Equality (CORE) director Floyd McKissick
declared his organization’s commitment to “ black male power,”  and
CORE’s intention to defer until “ tomorrow”  the “ equality of women,”107
Murray continued to press her race-sex analogy.108 Murray’s ACLU
colleagues were similarly inclined to discount the problem of sex
discrimination, calling it “ ‘relatively unimportant’ when compared with the
goal of eliminating race discrimination.”109 When Murray pushed for an
ACLU policy statement condemning sex discrimination in 1968, Equality
Committee members insisted that race discrimination must remain the top
priority.110 It was in response to this intransigence that Murray employed
analogical arguments to universalize demands for rights that threatened to
polarize the civil rights and feminist communities and to force a false
choice between the interests of blacks and women—a choice that erased
those at the intersection of categories.111
4. “An Integral Relation”: Women, Race, and Jury Service
Aside from the controversies over the wording and enforcement of Title
VII’s employment discrimination prohibition, the most prominent 1960s
appearance of analogical arguments came in the debate over the equal
protection implications of women’s exclusion from juries.112 In the context
106. Id. at 184 (describing Murray’s complaints about the exclusion of female speakers from
the 1963 March on Washington); MURRAY, supra note 49, at 353 (same).
107. Minutes, ACLU Equality Committee 4 (Dec. 28, 1967) (Pauli Murray P pers, MC 412,
Box 54, Folder 942, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University);
see also KERBER, supra note 51, at 195 (describing McKissick’s comments).
108. See, e.g., Minutes, ACLU Equality Committee 4 (Dec. 28, 1967) (Pauli Murray Papers,
MC 412, Box 54, Folder 943, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard
University).
109. Minutes, ACLU Equality Committee 2 (Apr. 26, 1966) (Pauli Murray Papers, MC 412,
Box 54, Folder 943, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University).
One of Murray’s colleagues argued that “ a simple equation regarding race and sex . . . is not
realistic,”  id., while another remained unconvinced that sex discrimination damaged group
prosperity in the same way that race discrimination harmed African Americans, id.
110. E.g., Minutes, ACLU Equality Committee 6 (June 6, 1968) (Pauli Murray Papers, MC
412, Box 54, Folder 943, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard
University) (“ Priority should be given, [Mr. Perkel] felt, to ending discrimination on the basis of
color. Anyone who wishes to add sex discrimination as a top priority criterion . . . will have to
show the necessity for having that issue come before race.” ). Murray and her supporters
eventually succeeded in 1970 in convincing the ACLU Board to reverse its longstanding policy
opposing the ERA. HARTMANN, supra note 105, at 71-81.
111. As historian Susan Hartmann writes, Murray and other African-American feminists
during this period “ used the authority of their identities and experiences as black women to fill
two critical gaps—the gap in racial justice efforts that left out women, and the gap in feminist
projects that neglected women of color.”  HARTMANN, supra note 105, at 205.
112. For an excellent discussion of the struggle to end discrimination against women in jury
service, see KERBER, supra note 51, at 124-222.
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of jury service, as in the workplace, race and sex discrimination were, in
practice, deeply intertwined. In many Southern jurisdictions, African
Americans and white women were excluded from juries—black men de
facto, and women de jure. A federal court found for the first time that the
exclusion of women from jury venires violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment in the 1966 Alabama case White v. Crook,113
which arose from the trial of the men accused of killing civil rights activists
Viola Liuzzo and Jonathan Daniels. The accused murderers were tried and
acquitted in Lowndes County, where white men of eligible age were just
6% of the county’s population, but composed 100% of every jury.114 With
Murray’s assistance, Dorothy Kenyon, a former judge and longtime
advocate of equal jury service for women, briefed the sex discrimination
issue for the Crook plaintiffs.115
Significantly, Gardenia White and the other female plaintiffs in Crook
were African Americans, whose exclusion from juries was the product of
both racist custom and sexist law.116 Analogical arguments that compared
sex discrimination to race discrimination in the jury service context were
therefore connective as well as comparative. In addition to asserting the
rights of black female potential jurors, Murray contended that the exclusion
of white women from juries was injurious to civil rights for African
Americans, for two reasons. First, she argued, white women would be more
sympathetic jurors in civil-rights-related cases than were white men; and
second, she worried that an expansion of black citizens’ rights without a
concomitant widening of women’s opportunities would engender ill will
among white women. A few weeks before the Crook ruling, Murray
persuaded the ACLU Board to approve a resolution proclaiming “ an
integral relation between the exclusion of women and exclusion of Negroes
in Southern courts.”117 The resolution explicitly tied women’s jury service
in the South to the accomplishment of civil rights goals and warned of the
“ evidence of rising resentment on the part of women”  that their demands
for equality were ignored.118 Again, in advancing an analogical argument
for the application of equal protection principles to women, Murray
emphasized the interconnections as well as the parallels between race and
sex discrimination in jury composition.
113. 251 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (per curiam).
114. KERBER, supra note 51, at 198. The murderers were later found guilty by a federal jury.
Id. at 197.
115. Id. at 197-99.
116. The New York Times noted “ the use of an all-purpose plaintiff—Negro women.”  Fred
P. Graham, Rights Case Yields Dividend for Women, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1966, at 8E.
117. Letter from Pauli Murray to Marguerite Rawalt 2 (Feb. 2, 1966) (Pauli Murray Papers,
MC 412, Box 59, Folder 999, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard
University) (quoting the ACLU resolution).
118. Id.
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5. Analogical Arguments on Behalf of “Compensatory Treatment”
For Murray, the race-sex analogy was not merely instrumental to the
removal of sex-based distinctions from the law; it was also a means of
expanding the possible remedies for all forms of discrimination. In debates
over “ compensatory treatment”  among ACLU Equality Committee
members in the mid-1960s, Murray maintained that some form of remedial
action was imperative to correct the injustices that created present racial
inequalities. She argued in 1964 that “ [c]learly remedial treatment is
necessary”  given the history of slavery and discrimination, and that
“ ‘[p]referential treatment’ must be seen as a part of remedial treatment.”119
But Murray broke ranks with her predominantly male ACLU
colleagues to suggest that compensatory policies should be directed at all
disadvantaged people, not just African Americans.120 Asserting that women
and other groups had histories of discrimination that were worthy of
redress, Murray expressed concern that embracing compensatory programs
for blacks only would imply an undesirable narrowing of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s scope to include African Americans but not women
generally.121 Furthermore, she argued, confining remedial programs to
blacks would permit the root causes of disadvantage to go unremedied,
provoke racial backlash,122 and allow the government to avoid truly
transformative economic investments in the inner cities and elsewhere.123
Though it might operate somewhat differently, Murray asserted that sex
discrimination was like race discrimination in that its lingering effects
warranted concerted remedial action. Murray’s position on compensatory
treatment reflected her belief that a race-sex analogy would expand the
universe of remedies for sex inequality beyond the horizon of formal
equality.
119. Letter from Pauli Murray to Aaron Levenstein, Chairman, New York Chapter, Jewish
Labor Committee (Feb. 19, 1964) (Pauli Murray Papers, MC 412, Box 104, Folder 1872, on file
with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University) (emphasis omitted).
120. Id.
121. Minutes, ACLU Equality Committee 5 (Nov. 30, 1967) (Pauli Murray Papers, MC 412,
Box 54, Folder 943, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University)
(“ [Murray] questioned what [compensatory treatment for African Americans only] would mean to
our general acceptance of the Fourteenth Amendment as broad enough to reach all people. Either
the breadth of the 14th Amendment would be narrowed, or we would imply that the Federal
government will take action to raise questions of compensatory treatment to all people.” ).
122. Id. (“ For every victory the Negro achieves, there are other groups who see that the
Negro gets special treatment while they are not even considered.” ).
123. Id. at 6.
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C. Murray’s Analogy in Historical Context: Interracial Coalition and
Remedial Flexibility
This historical context illuminates the content and meaning of Murray’s
analogical arguments about race and sex. In large part, Murray’s analogy
was a persuasive tool—an attempt to impress upon skeptics the normative
seriousness of sex-based inequality, and the importance of devoting
resources to its eradication. At a time when judges, legislators, the public at
large, and even dedicated reformers either justified women’s subordinate
position or downplayed its significance, comparing sexual subordination to
the recognized national problem of racial inequality was an attempt to lend
legitimacy and moral weight to the cause’s shaky foundations. The
analogies advanced by Murray and other lawyers were bolstered by a small
but suggestive postwar social science literature that explored the
operational and consequential parallels between racism and sexism and
inverted older models that posited similarities between racial and sexual
inferiority.
For Murray, the race-sex analogy was also a potentially powerful
means of linking two movements that threatened to diverge in divisive and
exclusionary ways. Murray invoked the analogy before multiple audiences:
white legislators who depicted the interests of African Americans and white
women as antagonistic; black and white civil rights activists who
subordinated women’s rights to the goal of male empowerment; and white
feminists who, for a variety of reasons, resisted links between race and sex.
The analogy, Murray believed, could place African-American women at the
center of the women’s movement and simultaneously minimize racial
backlash on the part of white women. At a time when women’s liberation
was represented publicly by works like Betty Friedan’s The Feminine
Mystique,124 which suggested women’s need for emancipation from middle-
class housewifery, Murray’s invocation of black women’s roles as workers
and heads of households altered the terrain of feminism.
Significantly, the concrete legal contexts in which Murray and others
successfully promoted race-sex analogies in the 1960s were employment
and jury service, both areas in which race and sex inequality were deeply
connected and in which African-American women were arguably the most
severely disadvantaged by discrimination. In both the workplace and the
jury box, race and sex discrimination were clearly intertwined as a matter of
everyday practice for women of all economic classes, so that the
elimination of sex discrimination could credibly be viewed as a necessary
part of racial emancipation. In these contexts, analogical arguments were
not merely abstract and comparative, but concrete and connective.
124. BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963).
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Furthermore, the legal consequences of the more abstract race-sex
analogies advanced with respect to sex-based classifications generally
remained ambiguous and fluid during this period. As Mary Becker has
noted, the Fourteenth Amendment strategy did not necessarily dictate a
commitment to formal equality, to the removal of all sex distinctions from
the law.125 To the contrary, Murray was careful to distinguish her
Fourteenth Amendment proposal from the pure formal equality principle
for which the ERA had come to stand. Her standard left the door open to
both protective labor regulations—the primary concern of ERA
opponents—and to measures “ designed to protect an equality of right
which women, because of their traditionally disadvantaged position in
society, themselves have been unable to assert adequately,”126 arguably a
reference to the kind of compensatory or remedial programs now called
affirmative action. Though labor-oriented reformers feared a racial analogy
might have similar consequences to an ERA, the greatest proponents of
formal equality had allied themselves with Southern segregationists and
rejected the race parallel.
By the end of the 1960s, Title VII had rendered the protective
legislation issue less salient, so that many women’s organizations reversed
their positions and supported a renewed effort on behalf of an ERA.127
Many, including Murray, had come to see the Fourteenth Amendment and
an ERA as alternative paths to similar ends.128 As Murray assured one
longtime ERA supporter, “ [W]e differ not so much in our objectives as in
our strategy.”129 In struggles over the Fourteenth Amendment, the ERA,
and Title VII alike, the race-sex analogy remained a means of legitimating
efforts to portray sex discrimination as an injury worthy of legal redress. To
be sure, the inclusion of sex alongside race, color, religion, and national
origin in Title VII provided no guarantee that the EEOC would equalize
enforcement, or that courts would treat various forms of discrimination
similarly—much less that Title VII would be an effective weapon against
125. Becker suggests that the feminist shift toward formal equality resulted in part from
modeling feminist legal strategy on the battle against Jim Crow before affirmative action became
a major legal issue. Becker, supra note 51, at 248-49. I complicate this account above at notes
119-123 and accompanying text.
126. Murray, supra note 52, at 17.
127. Becker, supra note 51, at 232, 238-39. Although some protective legislation proponents
continued to press their agenda, many lost their official positions when President Richard Nixon
took office in 1968. HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE PRESIDENCY 190-91 (1992).
128. E.g., Letter from Pauli Murray to Alma Lutz 1 (Dec. 9, 1965) (Pauli Murray Papers, MC
412, Box 97, Folder 1730, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard
University) (“ I . . . believe that the quickest way toobtain the results the Equal Rights
Amendment is intended to produce is to urge the courts to make clear that discrimination against
women by the state or federal governments violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” ).
129. Id. at 2.
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discrimination of any kind.130 But as the federal government seemed
inclined to take at least some steps to rectify racial discrimination through
Title VII enforcement, and civil rights organizations were pressing for
affirmative action efforts on behalf of racial minorities, race-sex analogies
had apparently expansive remedial consequences that feminist advocates
sought to harness.
To the extent that race-sex analogies had entered the legal discourse by
the mid- to late-1960s, then, they served to legitimate women’s rights, link
antiracist and feminist movements when their interests threatened to
diverge, emphasize the interconnections as well as the parallels between
race and sex discrimination, and expand the universe of available legal
remedies for sex-based inequality. As the next Part demonstrates, however,
the social meanings and legal consequences of race-sex analogies would be
subject to transformation and reinterpretation as they were partially and
selectively incorporated into constitutional jurisprudence and theory.
III. A NALOGIES UNLEASHED: NEW MEANINGS AND UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES OF RACE-SEX PARALLELS IN THE 1970S
To catalogue every instance of race-sex parallelism in feminist legal
thought, legislative activity, and adjudication during the 1970s is beyond
the scope of this Note. Rather, this Part examines a few instances of
analogical argumentation in constitutional litigation in order to illustrate
how changing historical conditions transformed analogies’ political and
legal implications. When feminist lawyers echoed Pauli Murray’s earlier
writings in their briefs to the Supreme Court in the early 1970s, the abstract
character of analogical constitutional arguments—so appealingly malleable
in the PCSW context a decade earlier—became a substantive and strategic
liability. As courts and legal commentators interpreted and reshaped race-
sex analogies, they often lost the complex and intersectional nuances
Murray and others had earlier exploited. Furthermore, as advocates’
analogical analysis was translated into legal doctrine against a backdrop of
increasing conservatism, analogies began to serve as limiting, rather than
expansive, instruments. The examples that follow illustrate how historically
contingent are the dynamics of analogical arguments, and help to explain
how a strategy once configured as racially inclusive and remedially flexible
130. For more on the EEOC’s enforcement failures, see FREEMAN, supra note 104, at 177-
90; and GRAHAM, supra note 127, at 102-16. On the more recent failure of courts to treat race and
sex discrimination allegations similarly, see Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender,
Work, and Choice: An Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases
Challenging Job Segregation, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073 (1992). On Title VII cases that failed to
recognize African-American women as victims of particular discrimination, see Caldwell, supra
note 10, at 374-81; and Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection, supra note 18, at 141-52.
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became a symbol of racial exclusion and an instrument of legal
circumscription.
A. The Quest for Sex as a Suspect Classification
Though Murray had proposed the Fourteenth Amendment strategy in
1962, it was not until the early 1970s that feminist lawyers successfully
presented a sex discrimination case to the Supreme Court. When they
finally did so in Reed v. Reed,131 a suit challenging an Idaho statute
preferring male estate administrators, it was under the aegis of the ACLU
Women’s Rights Project (WRP), headed by Ruth Bader Ginsburg. The
Reed “ grandmother brief”132 consolidated the race-sex analogy Murray had
developed over the preceding decade to argue for the treatment of sex as a
“ suspect classification,”  and provided a template for future WRP sex
discrimination briefs.
In the Reed brief, the WRP argued that sex and race were both
“ congenital, unalterable trait[s] of birth,”133 characterized courts’
unwillingness to recognize the injustice of sex discrimination as a mistake
comparable to the Plessy decision,134 and drew the familiar parallel between
slavery and women’s status at common law.135 At several points, the brief
echoed Murray’s emphasis on the centrality of African-American women to
the struggles against slavery and women’s subordination, and attempted to
undermine the notion that women’s lives had historically been filled with
privilege. “ [N]o pedestal marks the place occupied by most women,”  the
brief asserted, going on to quote Sojourner Truth at length.136 Several amici
curiae joined the WRP in drawing heavily upon the race-sex analogy,
flooding the Court with entreaties to treat sex and race discrimination as
similar and equivalent harms prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment.137
131. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
132. Brief for Appellant, Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (No. 70-4).
133. Id. at 5. The WRP was also able to cite a recent California case that affirmed the race-
sex analogy in declaring sex a suspect classification under the state constitution. Id. at 20-21
(citing Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529, 540-41 (Cal. 1971)).
134. Id. at 12-13 (“ Very recent history has taught us that, where racial discrimination is
concerned, this Court’s refusal in Plessy v. Ferguson to declare the practice unconstitutional,
reinforced the institutional and political foundations of racism, made it more difficult eventually
to extirpate, and postponed for fifty-eight years the inevitable inauguration of a national
commitment to abolish racial discrimination.”  (citation omitted)).
135. Id. at 28-29.
136. Id. at 31.
137. Joint Brief of Amici Curiae American Veterans Committee and NOW Legal Defense
and Education Fund at 10-12, Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (devoting a section to the proposition that “ [s]ex
and race discrimination are greatly similar and deserve similar constitutional treatment” ); Brief of
Amicus Curiae the City of New York at 16, Reed, 404 U.S 71 (“ [T]he net effect of sexual, like
racial classifications is the same.” ); Brief of Amicus Curiae the National Federation of Business
and Professional Women’s Clubs at 8, Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (asserting that “ sex discrimination takes
an even greater economic toll than racial discrimination” ).
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The Court’s decision in Reed was a victory for the WRP and its
allies,138 though the opinion contained only a cryptic declaration that
administrative convenience would not suffice as a rationale for
discriminating on the basis of sex.139 The WRP continued to urge the Court
to declare sex a suspect classification, and less than two years later, in
Frontiero v. Richardson,140 these efforts came tantalizingly close to fruition.
A four-Justice plurality, led by Brennan, accepted strict scrutiny as the
appropriate standard for evaluating laws that drew distinctions on the basis
of sex, in the course of invalidating a military benefit scheme that
automatically awarded men a housing allowance and medical care for their
wives, but required that women prove their husbands’ dependency in order
to receive the same benefits. Brennan wrote of the nation’s “ long and
unfortunate history of sex discrimination,”141 which, he suggested, was
significant because of its similarity to racial subjugation:
[T]hroughout much of the 19th century the position of women in
our society was, in many respects, comparable to that of blacks
under the pre-Civil War slave codes. Neither slaves nor women
could hold office, serve on juries, or bring suit in their own names,
and married women traditionally were denied the legal capacity to
hold or convey property or to serve as legal guardians of their own
children.142
He continued: “ [S]ex, like race and national origin, is an immutable
characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth.”143 In Brennan’s
formulation, “ women”  and “ blacks”  seemed to be mutually exclusive
categories, and the history of women’s status in the American legal system
appeared relevant only insofar as it resembled antebellum racial
subjugation.
The fate of race-sex analogies in Reed and Frontiero reveals the
profound context-dependency of their social meaning and legal
consequences. The WRP’s “ grandmother brief”  essentially replicated the
substance of many of the analogical arguments Murray had advanced in the
preceding decade,144 but the contexts in which they were presented differed
138. Ginsburg had not expected that the Court would accept her suspect classification
argument right away. Deborah L. Markowitz, In Pursuit of Equality: One Woman’s Work To
Change the Law, 14 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 335, 341-42 & n.86 (1992).
139. Reed, 404 U.S. at 76-77.
140. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
141. Id. at 684.
142. Id. at 685.
143. Id. at 686-87. The language of Brennan’s opinion was remarkably similar to the wording
of the California Supreme Court’s decision in Sail’er Inn. See supra note 133.
144. Indeed, although her direct participation in the Reed case was limited, Murray was
credited as one of the brief’s authors and was quoted at length in the brief. Brief for Appellant at
17-18, Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (No. 70-4).
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markedly from those of their 1960s incarnations. For one thing, the
analogies’ audience no longer consisted of feminists and civil rights
activists who failed to see their movements’ interdependencies, or of
legislators construing a sex discrimination prohibition as an instrument of
racial division rather than a completion of the civil rights movement’s
emancipatory project. Furthermore, the race-sex analogy in Reed and
Frontiero was purely a legal-categorical comparison: Unlike the
employment and jury service contexts, where race and sex discrimination
overlapped in concrete, practical ways, discriminatory estate administration
policies and spousal military benefits had no immediately evident racial
counterparts. Indeed, the facts of Frontiero prompted the Court plurality to
remark on the detrimental effects of placing women “ on a pedestal,”145 a
position in which poor women and women of color had never found
themselves, as the WRP brief in Reed had itself acknowledged.146
The analogies’ new audience and increasingly abstract quality had
significant consequences for the manner in which the WRP’s analogical
arguments were incorporated into equal protection jurisprudence. Although
the WRP briefs recounted the interconnections between struggles for racial
justice and women’s rights campaigns, the analogy articulated by Justice
Brennan in the Frontiero plurality opinion was merely comparative rather
than connective. Thus, in addition to granting the history of women’s status
and struggles “ no independent legal significance,”  and “ generat[ing] a
narrative that efface[d] the history of women’s treatment in the American
legal system,”  as Reva Siegel has observed of the Frontiero opinion,147 the
Court passed up an opportunity to provide a meaningful account of the
socio-historical interrelationship between race and sex inequality.
Frontiero’s invocation of the race-sex analogy had other important
ramifications for the future of equal protection jurisprudence. For one, in
listing the ways in which sex discrimination resembled race discrimination
as a justification for heightened judicial scrutiny, the plurality ratified a list
of qualifying attributes that could as easily constrain as expand the Equal
Protection Clause’s scope and applicability to other subordinated groups.
Moreover, because Justice Brennan justified the application of strict
scrutiny to sex-based classifications more or less solely on the basis of a
parallel between race and sex as categories, his opinion could be read to
imply that sex discrimination violated the equal protection guarantee if and
only if it resembled discrimination based on race. In court, the analogy had
become both more abstract, divorced from material connections between
145. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684.
146. See supra text accompanying note 136.
147. Reva B. Siegel, Collective Memory and the Nineteenth Amendment: Reasoning About
“the Woman Question” in the Discourse of Sex Discrimination, n HISTORY, MEMORY, AND THE
LAW 131, 171 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1999).
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race and sex discrimination—and more concrete, reifying specific legal
consequences that feminists had thus far managed to avoid.
B. “Getting the Court To Understand They Couldn’t Lump Sex and Race
Together”: Refinement of and Retreat from Analogical Arguments
The ambiguous legal ramifications of the analogical arguments that had
rendered Murray’s Fourteenth Amendment strategy so attractive to various
factions in the early 1960s became less of a virtue in the context of early
1970s litigation, as the WRP discovered in Kahn v. Shevin.148 When Kahn
reached the Supreme Court with neither the knowledge nor the approval of
the WRP,149 feminist lawyers feared that the race-sex analogy embraced by
the Court’s liberal wing in Frontiero would lead these Justices to
misconstrue a property tax exemption for widows as a permissible
affirmative action measure. In Kahn, the WRP assiduously avoided
invoking a race-sex analogy to a Court simultaneously considering DeFunis
v. Odegaard,150 an attack on the University of Washington Law School’s
affirmative action policy by a white male plaintiff. Viewing the widows’
exemption as a paternalistic law catering to outdated conceptions of
women’s roles, the WRP was anxious to make sure the Court distinguished
between “ [g]eneralized provisions based on gender stereotypes”  and
“ affirmative action measures tailored narrowly and specifically to rectify
the effects of past discrimination against women.”151 Ginsburg later
described the WRP’s challenge in Kahn as “ get[ting] the Court to
understand they couldn’t lump sex and race together; that there were
differences.”152
The dilemma in which Ginsburg and her colleagues found themselves
in Kahn illustrates how their zealous promotion of racial analogies became
hazardous to feminists when the racial baseline legal remedy did not
comport with their conception of appropriate remedies for sex
discrimination in a particular case. Conversely, a WRP repudiation of the
race-sex analogy could be, willfully or ingenuously, mistaken for a
rejection of remedial policies altogether, despite the WRP’s support for
such measures.153 In fact, in the mid-1970s, Ginsburg’s writings began to
148. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
149. Ruth B. Cowan, Women’s Rights Through Litigation: An Examination of the American
Civil Liberties Union Women’s Rights Project, 1971-1976, 8 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 373,
390-91 (1976); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender in the Supreme Court: The 1973 and 1974
Terms, 1975 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 21 (calling Kahn “ the wrong case brought to the Court at the
wrong time” ).
150. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
151. Brief for Appellants at 24 n.19, Kahn, 416 U.S. 351 (No. 73-78).
152. Cowan, supra note 149, at 393.
153. The WRP’s support for affirmative action throughout the 1970s complicates Hugh Davis
Graham’s assertion that by 1972, feminists had embraced an individual rights paradigm that
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urge a more nuanced analogical relationship between race and sex
discrimination, one that honored the differences as well as the similarities
between the two forms of inequality.154 Her retreat from the rhetoric of
race-sex parallelism was not an effort to eliminate all possibility of gender-
based affirmative action. Indeed, Ginsburg specifically endorsed aggressive
recruitment efforts, the elimination of employment and educational tests
and standards unrelated to performance, special training programs to help
women overcome the effects of previous discrimination, and goals and
timetables in appropriate circumstances.155 What she sought to avoid in
retreating from the race-sex analogy was the use of remedial justifications
for laws rooted in women’s subordination and dependency. In short,
Ginsburg had recognized the double-edged quality of race-sex analogies,
and was attempting to invoke them in more selective and subtle ways.
For these and other reasons,156 Kahn marked the beginning of the end of
the race-sex analogy as a consistent centerpiece of WRP strategy in the
courts. WRP briefs in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld157 and Craig v. Boren158
relied upon arguments independent of the race parallel, stressing the
Supreme Court’s new sex discrimination jurisprudence without making an
explicit bid for the recognition of sex as a suspect classification. If
Frontiero represented the apex of the race-sex analogy in constitutional
jurisprudence, Craig was something of a nadir, as the Court defined a new
intermediate scrutiny standard for sex-based classifications in the course of
invalidating a law discriminating against underage men who wished to
purchase watered-down beer. Craig, even more than Kahn, was a case
brought to the Supreme Court against the wishes of feminists, and its trivial
subject matter could not have provided a starker contrast to the serious and
weighty crusades for justice that had defined race discrimination
jurisprudence under the Equal Protection Clause.159 Once attractive as a
means of highlighting the comparable moral seriousness of sex
sharply contrasted with the black civil rights movement’s quest for group-based rights. GRAHAM,
supra note 127, at 234.
154. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 29
(1975) (“ [C]hanging those patterns [of discrimination] entails recognition that generators of race
and sex discrimination are often different. . . . Doctrine directed to the continuing impact of race
segregation is not necessarily applicable to gender discrimination. . . . In short, most nonminority
females do not encounter a formidable risk of ‘death at an early age.’” ).
155. Id. at 30-34.
156. The WRP’s strategy also reflected a practical calculation that the Court was unlikely to
embrace sex as a suspect classification after only four Justices had approved such an approach in
Frontiero. Cowan, supra note 149, at 398; Markowitz, supra note 138, at 350.
157. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
158. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
159. Markowitz, supra note 138, at 356-57; Siegel, supra note 147, at 171-72; see also
MacKinnon, supra note 8, at 1299-301 (arguing that the trivial nature of cases like Craig exposes
the fact that the most serious forms of sex inequality are not the result of facially discriminatory
legal classifications).
MAYERIFINAL.DOC MARCH 5, 2001 3/5/01 3:57 PM
1078 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 110: 1045
discrimination, the race-sex analogy had, ironically, become an unwelcome
reminder of the gulf between laws like the one challenged in Craig and the
racial apartheid of Jim Crow.
Even as feminist litigators backed away from analogical arguments in
many of the cases on their mid-1970s docket, their reliance upon the
Fourteenth Amendment made comparisons to race on the part of judges
evaluating their claims virtually inevitable. Those comparisons could
constrain judicial recognition of equal protection harms as easily as they
could expand the scope of protection. For instance, though it is difficult to
determine whether the lack of a ready analogy to race contributed to the
Court’s failure to regard pregnancy-related discrimination as sex
discrimination for the purposes of equal protection analysis,160 a connection
seems possible, if not likely. Similarly, the Court’s disinclination to
overturn the Third Circuit’s decision in Vorchheimer v. School District,161
an unsuccessful challenge to sex segregation in Philadelphia’s elite public
high schools, may have stemmed from judicially perceived differences
between race and sex segregation.162
Furthermore, the race-sex analogy’s utility for feminists was
undermined by the changing political climate. As the 1970s wore on, an
increasingly conservative Court scaled back the available remedies for
racial discrimination. When the Court placed limits upon the ability of the
Equal Protection Clause to remedy racial inequality, those limits bled
almost inevitably into the sex discrimination context. Although sex
discriminatory motives were arguably even more difficult to prove than
racially invidious intentions, the 1979 case P rsonnel Administrator v.
Feeney163 confirmed that the Court’s restrictive conception of what
constituted state-sponsored racial discrimination would similarly constrain
recognition of sex discrimination. Echoing the racial disparate impact case
Washington v. Davis,164 the Court required a showing that the
160. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (upholding a California law denying
disability benefits for pregnancy-related disabilities). The parties in Geduldig did not use
analogical arguments, though at least two amicus briefs pointed out that a policy denying
disability benefits to sickle cell anemia sufferers would clearly constitute invidious racial
discrimination. Brief of the Physicians Forum as Amicus Curiae at 13, Geduldig, 417 U.S. 484
(No. 73-640); Brief of the United States Equal Opportunity Employment Commission as Amicus
Curiae at 7-8, Geduldig, 417 U.S 484. Briefs supporting California argued that, unlike race and
sex, pregnancy was not an “ immutable characteristic”  determined solely by an “ accident of
birth.”  Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America at 36,
Geduldig, 417 U.S 484.
161. 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), aff’d by an equally divided court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977). The
Third Circuit’s ruling provoked a stinging dissent that accepted the plaintiff’s race-sex analogy.
Vorchheimer, 532 F.2d at 889 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of “ establishing a
twentieth-century sexual equivalent to the Pl ssy decision” ).
162. Unlike most post-Frontiero cases, the WRP utilized race-sex analogies in Vorchheimer.
Brief for the Petitioners at 21-25, Vorchheimer, 430 U.S. 703 (No. 76-37).
163. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
164. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
MAYERIFINAL.DOC MARCH 5, 2001 3/5/01 3:57 PM
2001] Race-Gender Analogies 1079
Massachusetts legislature specifically intended to disadvantage women
when it instituted employment preferences for veterans.
Feminists’ early reliance on race-sex analogies to plead their cause
under the Fourteenth Amendment may well have contributed to the
establishment of a tight link in judges’ minds between the resemblance of
sex to race discrimination, on the one hand, and the legitimacy of sex-based
equal protection claims, on the other. Conversely, though perceived
differences in the dynamics of race and sex discrimination had led the Court
to forswear strict scrutiny of sex-based classifications, when those
differences might have led to an expansion of Fourteenth Amendment
protection the Court declined to invoke them. Meanwhile, as the political
winds shifted toward a more conservative racial policy, race was becoming
a less effective template for the accomplishment of feminist objectives.
C. Questions That Are “Sui Generis”: The Elusive ERA
The doctrinal consequences of tying the Fourteenth Amendment
litigation strategy to a race-sex analogy were aggravated by the failure of
the other constitutional route feminists pursued in the 1970s—the ERA.
The ERA literature reveals that many proponents believed an independent
constitutional amendment would allow them to reap the benefits of a race-
sex analogy without suffering any detrimental doctrinal effects. By the
early 1970s, many prominent ERA advocates embraced race-sex parallels
to the extent that they illuminated the seriousness of sex inequality’s moral
challenge, its practical consequences, and, to some extent, its operational
dynamics. For ERA supporters, the analogy to race remained a useful
persuasive tool. For instance, in her congressional testimony and published
writings, Pauli Murray emphasized the importance of the ERA to African-
American women as a means of completing the civil rights revolution.165
But many of the most influential legal writings on the ERA also touted
the amendment as necessary to redress the shortcomings of the race-sex
analogy by providing an independent analytic framework and legal
remedies that lacked a ready racial analogue. A much cited Harvard Law
Review note declared that “ [t]he similarities between race and sex
discrimination are indeed striking . . . . Yet the analogy has its limits, and
sex discrimination, if it is to be constitutionally attacked, must be treated as
a problem in its own right.”166 Yale Law Professor Thomas Emerson, a
165. See, e.g., Pauli Murray, The Negro Woman’s Stake in the Equal Rights Amendment, 6
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 253 (1971); see also Pauli Murray, The Liberation of Black Women, i
VOICES OF THE NEW FEMINISM 87, 101 (Mary Lou Thompson ed., 1970) (“ [B]lack women can
neither postpone nor subordinate the fight against sex discrimination to the Black Revolution.” ).
166. Note, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do We Need a Constitutional
Amendment?, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1499, 1507-08 (1971).
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coauthor of the famous “ Yale ERA”  article,167 argued that “ taken as a
whole, the problems of race discrimination are somewhat different from
those of sex discrimination . . . . In short, the establishment of equal rights
for women poses questions that are in important ways sui generis. An
effective solution demands a separate constitutional doctrine.”168
In contrast to the early 1960s, when the Fourteenth Amendment
appeared as a flexible alternative to the more rigid formal equality mandate
of an ERA, by the early 1970s, it was the ERA that promised flexibility and
the positive features of a race-sex analogy while the Fourteenth
Amendment was associated with the racial parallel’s limiting aspects. So
long as the ERA remained viable, legal feminists had an alternative strategy
with the potential to recognize differences as well as similarities between
racial and gender inequality. While the ERA lingered on the horizon,169
feminists had less reason to fear that all of their hopes for legal equality
were tethered to a somewhat flawed race parallel that courts seemed only
partially prepared to accept.
The examples related in this Part illustrate how historically contingent
and context-dependent are the social meanings and legal consequences of
analogical arguments. Abstracted from their original contexts, race-sex
analogies presented to the Supreme Court by the WRP became embedded
in constitutional doctrine in a skeletal form that limited the scope of
cognizable discrimination in significant ways. Even when feminist
advocates revised, qualified, and selectively withdrew their analogical
arguments as the 1970s wore on, the drawbacks of analogy continued to
haunt constitutional sex discrimination jurisprudence. The ERA, once
viewed as a rigid counterpoint to the more flexible Fourteenth Amendment,
came to represent an opportunity to reap the substantial rhetorical
advantages of a racial comparison, while preserving the opportunity to
shape an independent sex discrimination paradigm.
Meanwhile, as some of the most creative constitutional theorizing
incorporated versions of the race-sex analogy that obscured the experiences
and concerns of women of color,170 some feminists outside the legal arena
167. Barbara Brown et al., The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal
Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971).
168. Thomas I. Emerson, In Support of the Equal Rights Amendment, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 225, 229-30 (1971).
169. No states ratified the ERA after 1977, but several came close before the ratification
period expired in June 1982. JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA 184 (1986). For
analyses of the ERA’s defeat, see MARY FRANCES BERRY, WHY ERA FAILED (1986); and
MANSBRIDGE, supra.
170. E.g., Jo Freeman, The Legal Basis of the Sexual Caste System, 5 VAL. U. L. REV. 203,
222 (1971) (comparing racial and sexual “ caste systems”  and arguing that the failure to extend
suffrage to women in the late nineteenth century “ had the same effect that Plessey [sic] v.
Ferguson had for Negroes” ); W. William Hodes, Women and the Constitution: Some Legal
History and a New Approach to the Nineteenth Amendment, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 26, 50 (1970)
(proposing a revival of the Nineteenth Amendment as “ the ultimate parallel between the law of
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became increasingly vocal in their opposition to analogical arguments. To
them, race-sex analogies had become symbols of racial privilege and a
distorted, exclusionary feminist ideology.171 Changing political and legal
conditions had transformed the analogy’s symbolic and practical meaning.
For better or worse, race-sex analogies continue to play a crucial role in
the construction and interpretation of America’s antidiscrimination laws.
The next Part briefly examines one contemporary instance that encapsulates
many of the ways in which the reception of analogical arguments, however
carefully advanced, may limit rather than expand the scope of available
remedies for gender inequality in a changing political climate.
IV. RACE-GENDER ANALOGIES IN THE 1990S: THE VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN ACT’S CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDY
Race-sex analogies remain integral to the ways in which feminists
envision and attempt to implement legal remedies for gender inequality
today. The construction and defense of the civil rights remedy of the
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), which created a civil cause of
action against private individual perpetrators of “ gender-motivated
violence,”172 reveals how nuanced analogies between race- and gender-
based harms can be transformed into restrictive limitations on the scope of
possible legal remedies.
Faced with resistance to the inclusion of the category “ gender”  in hate
crimes legislation,173 in the early 1990s feminist groups sought a separate
the woman and the law of the black man” ); Diana E. Richmond, Down Home: A New Focus on
Thirteenth Amendment Slavery, WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP., Fall/Winter 1972-73, at 29, 29-30
(arguing that because “ women in this country are forced by statute and prejudice to endure
vestiges of slavery similar to those suffered by American blacks,”  courts should “ apply the
Thirteenth Amendment to women” ).
171. E.g., Frances Beale, Double Jeopardy: To Be Black and Female, in THE BLACK
WOMAN 90, 98 (Toni Cade ed., 1970) (identifying “ quite basic”  differences between black and
white women as undermining any parallel); Linda La Rue, The Black Movement and Women’s
Liberation, BLACK SCHOLAR, May 1970, at 36, 36 (“ [A]ny attempt to analogize black oppression
with the plight of the American white woman has the validity of comparing the neck of a hanging
man with the hands of an amateur mountain climber with rope burns.” ); Catharine Stimpson,
“Thy Neighbor’s Wife, Thy Neighbor’s Servants”: Women’s Liberation and Black Civil Rights, n
WOMAN IN SEXIST SOCIETY 452, 473-74 (Vivian Gornick & Barbara K. Moran eds., 1971)
(criticizing race-sex analogies for “ exploit[ing] the passion, ambition, and vigor of the black
movement,” for being “ [i]ntellectually sloppy,” for “ evad[ing], in the rhetorical haze, the harsh
fact of white women’s racism,” and for precluding an independent feminist identity). But see
SHIRLEY CHISHOLM, UNBOUGHT AND UNBOSSED 163-67 (1970) (using a race-sex analogy to
underscore the importance of feminist activism); Pauli Murray, The Rights of Women, in THE
RIGHTS OF AMERICANS 521 (Norman Dorsen ed., 1970) (utilizing race-sex analogies); sources
cited supra note 165 (same).
172. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
173. See, e.g., ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF B’NAI B’RITH, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION
POLICY BACKGROUND REPORT, HATE CRIMES STATUTES: INCLUDING WOMEN AS VICTIMS 12
(1990), quoted in Violence Against Women: Victims of the System: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 273-74 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 VAWA Hearing] (“ While a
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legislative remedy that would reframe violence against women as a civil
rights issue.174 Proponents of the civil rights remedy advanced a race-gender
analogy designed to harness the moral opprobrium surrounding racially
motivated violence by reconceptualizing sexual and intrafamily assaults as
civil rights violations. “ We seek to show,”  Dr. Leslie Wolfe of the Center
for Women Policy Studies told the Senate Judiciary Committee in a 1991
hearing, “ that acts of violence based on gender—like acts of violence based
on race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, and sexual identity—are not
random, isolated acts but rather are crimes against individuals that are
meant to intimidate and terrorize the larger group or class of people—
women.”175 However, the provision’s supporters were careful to distinguish
the legal remedy they were seeking from existing civil rights laws, which,
they asserted, did not offer adequate protection to women. For instance,
Sally Goldfarb of the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund (NOW
LDEF) noted that “ the basic concept”  of the civil rights remedy
“ resembles that of the Reconstruction-era civil rights laws,”  but that certain
distinctions were “ necessary because gender-based violence typically
differs from the types of racial violence directed against men.”176
Nevertheless, when the remedy came under attack as too expansive,
supporters had to convince skeptics that the provision would not flood the
federal courts with assault cases or interfere with state prerogatives.177 They
were constrained to do so by defining gender-motivated crimes of violence
to include only crimes that resembled a narrowly conceived racial violence
paradigm, an analogy that significantly limited the remedy’s reach. VAWA
sponsor Senator Joseph Biden frequently invoked post-Civil War civil
rights laws, urging his colleagues to “ [t]hink about the difference between a
hate crime against a black sends a message to all blacks, the same logic does not follow in many
sexual assaults. Victims are not necessarily ‘interchangeable’ in the same way; in cases of marital
rape or date rape for example, the relationship between individual perpetrator and victim is the
salient fact—whether the defendant is a woman-hater in general is irrelevant.” ).
174. For a historical account of marital prerogative and privacy discourses justifying violence
against women, see Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife-Beating as Prerogative and
Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996).
175. 1991 VAWA Hearing, supra note 173, at 257-58 (statement of Leslie R. Wolfe, Director,
Center for Women Policy Studies).
176. Violence Against Women Act of 1993: Hearings on H.R. 1133 Before the Subcomm. On
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 10 (1993)
[hereinafter 1993 VAWA Hearing] (statement of Sally Goldfarb, Senior Staff Attorney, NOW
LDEF).
177. E.g., id. at 80 (statement of the Conference of Chief Justices) (expressing concern that
the civil rights remedy would “ plunge the federal government into this complex area which has
been traditionally reserved to the states” ); id. at 75 (report of the Proceedings of the Judicial
Conference of the United States) (stating that enactment of the remedy would further overload
federal court dockets); see also Judith Resnik, The Programmatic Judiciary: Lobbying, Judging,
and Invalidating the Violence Against Women Act, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 269 (2000) (discussing the
federal judiciary’s role in the civil rights remedy controversy). On federal courts’ reluctance to
exercise jurisdiction over topics perceived as gender-related, see Judith Resnik, “Naturally”
Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682 (1991).
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mugging of a person who happens to be an African-American and a
lynching of an African-American by an all-white mob . . . . [VAWA]
specifically provides that ‘random’ crimes NOT motivated by gender bias
are not covered.”178 Similarly, the acting Assistant Attorney General for
civil rights testified before Congress that “ the animus element should
substantially reduce the number of meritorious actions and allow only those
litigants who are proven victims of discrimination in a tr ditional sense to
succeed.”179
Feminist advocates of the provision did not endorse such explicit
limitations on the remedy’s scope. However, they too emphasized that the
concept of gender motivation was no mystery—it would be proven in
exactly the same manner as racial motivation under other statutes. NOW
LDEF attorney Goldfarb listed the relevant factors in racial bias inquiries as
including
racially derogatory epithets used by the assailant, membership
of the victim in a different racial group . . . a history of similar
attacks by the assailant . . . a pattern of attacks against victims of a
certain race . . . lack of provocation, [and] use of force that is
excessive. . . . By substituting ‘gender’ for ‘race’ in the foregoing
list, it becomes apparent that many—but not all—crimes against
women will qualify.180
Feminists were, understandably, invoking a preexisting consensus about the
nature of bias crimes as anonymous, hate-filled, violent outbursts directed
against victims discriminatorily selected based on their group membership.
Notwithstanding their undeniable rhetorical and precedential appeal,
reliance on the existing paradigms of racial motivation had the potential to
limit significantly the civil rights remedy’s ability to redress gender-
subordinating violence. As several commentators have noted, the aspects of
violence that handicap women’s quest for equality are not necessarily
correlated with overt expressions of hatred or hostility of the kind
contemplated in racial bias crime laws.181 Furthermore, reliance on
prevailing conceptions of racially motivated hate crimes to define the
178. 140 CONG. REC. S6102 (daily ed. May 19, 1994) (statement of Sen. Biden).
179. 1993 VAWA Hearing, supra note 176, at 102 (statement of James P. Turner, Acting
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice) (emphasis added).
180. Id. at 7 (statement of Sally Goldfarb, Senior Staff Attorney, NOW LDEF); see also Julie
Goldscheid, Gender-Motivated Violence: Developing a Meaningful Paradigm for Civil Rights
Enforcement, 22 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 123 (1999) (explicating how gender-motivated violence
could be proven with the same types of evidence used to prove intent under other civil rights
laws).
181. E.g., Birgit Schmidt am Busch, Domestic Violence and Title III of the Violence Against
Women Act of 1993: A Feminist Critique, 6 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 1 (1995); David Frazee, An
Imperfect Remedy for Imperfect Violence: The Construction of Civil Rights in the Violence
Against Women Act, 1 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 163 (1993).
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parameters of gender motivation was consequential not only because
gender-subordinating violence differed from racial violence, but also
because the baseline conception of racially motivated violence as
anonymous and impersonal, with interchangeable victims, obscured the
historical complexities of racial subordination.182
Indeed, the relationship between the civil rights remedy and existing
civil rights law proved problematic on a number of levels. Some in the civil
rights community expressed concern that a vague or narrow interpretation
of the civil rights remedy’s intent requirement would seep insidiously into
the interpretation of other antidiscrimination statutes, with “ troubling
repercussions for other types of civil rights cases.”183 Furthermore, though
the remedy’s architects sought to create an independent remedy to address
gender-based violence, without the inclusion of other categories of
discrimination the fate of victims at the intersection of categories remained
uncertain.184 And although witnesses testified to racial and class disparities
in rape investigations and prosecutions,185 and emphasized the
interconnections as well as the similarities between race- and gender-based
violence,186 these observations did not appear in the congressional
documents that would compose the civil rights remedy’s official legislative
history.
The legislative remedy that emerged from the VAWA debate suffered
from many of the analytic and strategic drawbacks identified by the
critiques of analogical argumentation described in Part I. But it was the
changing political and legal climate that would distort the race-sex
analogy’s meaning and consequences in the most severely damaging ways.
Once the VAWA civil rights remedy became law, the most pressing
challenges to its viability came not from statutory construction but from
constitutional objections. The constitutional parallel to race had been
advantageous to civil rights remedy proponents while the bill was under
consideration in Congress, since at the time of VAWA’s passage in 1994,
182. Lynching, for instance, was often a reaction to economic or political success of African
Americans. E.g., W. FITZHUGH BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING IN THE NEW SOUTH 111-13 (1993).
183. 1993 VAWA Hearing, supra note 176, at 20 (statement of Elizabeth Symonds,
Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union).
184. Frazee, supra note 181, at 214-19.
185. E.g., 1991 VAWA Hearing, supra note 173, at 138 (statement of Gill Freeman, Chair,
Florida Supreme Court Gender Bias Study Implementation Commission) (testifying to racial
disparities in police responsiveness to rapes and to the designation of assaults against poor and
minority women as “ dirty feet rapes” ).
186. E.g., 1993 VAWA Hearing, supra note 176, at 11 (statement of Sally Goldfarb, Senior
Staff Attorney, NOW LDEF) (noting that “ rape by individual white men acting in a private
capacity, which has historically been a widespread form of oppression of African-American
women, has never been actionable under the civil rights laws ostensibly designed to protect all
African-Americans from racial terrorism” ).
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the Supreme Court had yet to decide United States v. Lopez187 and City of
Boerne v. Flores.188 But after Lopez and Boerne rendered the Commerce
Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment problematic sources of
congressional authority, the civil rights remedy’s defenders were called
upon to defend its similarity to race-based civil rights laws.
In this constricting constitutional context, the race parallel became
simultaneously more important and more dangerous for supporters of the
civil rights remedy. The conservative judicial response to assertions that
gender-motivated violence was both substantively comparable to racially
motivated violence and legally regulable under the same constitutional
auspices was threefold: to refute the accuracy of the parallel; to make an
exact analogy a necessary condition of the remedy’s legitimacy; and to
eviscerate virtually all of the analogy’s utility by interpreting congressional
power to remedy racial discrimination extremely narrowly.
In his opinion for the Fourth Circuit en banc in Brzonkala v. Virginia
Polytechnic Institute,189 Judge Michael Luttig rejected the race-gender
analogy to the extent that characterizing gender-based violence as a civil
rights violation would permit any federal role in domestic relations, which
he considered a quintessential state responsibility. Though states were not
permitted to exercise discretionary control over the enforcement of laws
against racial violence, Luttig charged that “ [b]y entering into this most
traditional area of state concern, Congress has . . . substantially reduced the
States’ ability to calibrate the extent of judicial supervision of intrafamily
violence.”190 Later in the opinion, the Fourth Circuit majority was more
straightforward in its unwillingness to accept the race-gender analogy,
meanwhile suggesting that gender-based denials of equal protection must
replicate a circumscribed set of race-based discriminations in order to
warrant Fourteenth Amendment action:
[T]he conduct targeted by section 13981 bears little resemblance to
the discriminatory state denial of equal protection or other conduct
that is the concern of the Reconstruction Amendments . . . . [T]he
particular shortcomings ascribed by Congress to the States are not
so much intentional—and thus unconstitutional—discrimination . . .
but rather the failure, despite “ fervent”  and “ sincere”  efforts, to
eradicate the “ subtle prejudices”  and “ stereotypes”  that prevent
187. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (ruling the Gun-Free School Zones Act an unconstitutional exercise
of the commerce power).
188. 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (invalidating the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as exceeding
congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
189. 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
190. Id. at 843.
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the victims of gender-motivated crimes from obtaining legal
vindication in the state courts.191
This characterization not only obscured the ways in which state-sanctioned
gender discrimination was in fact the result of intentional acts, but also
reinforced the requirement that, in order to be actionable, sex discrimination
must resemble the particular rights violations perpetuated by the Southern
states against African-American citizens in the post-Civil War era.192
The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Morrison193 for the
most part avoided explicitly engaging the petitioners’ claims of analogical
relationship between the civil rights remedy, on the one hand, and the 1964
Civil Rights Act and Reconstruction-era remedies for racial violence, on the
other. In contrast, the dissenters emphasized the resemblance between
gender-based violence and the racial discrimination Congress was permitted
to prohibit under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, arguing that the provision
fell squarely within a tradition of remedying inequality.194 But in a very
brief discussion denying the provision’s constitutional basis in Congress’s
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the majority first
narrowly circumscribed the remedial possibilities for even racially
discriminatory state action, and then dismissively characterized the
evidence of states’ discriminatory behavior in the gender context as
minimal.195 Not only did the Court implicitly reject a race-gender analogy,
but the tightening strictures of federalism constrained the very civil rights
paradigm that had given the analogy its power.
V. CONCLUSION
Proponents of VAWA’s civil rights remedy marshaled analogical
arguments in a careful and nuanced manner that avoided many of the
analytic pitfalls associated with race-gender analogies. They chose a
context in which race and gender intersected at the level of concrete social
191. Id. at 852 (citations omitted).
192. Amicus briefs in United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000), also attempted to
undermine the race-gender analogies advanced by the petitioners. Se , e.g., Brief of Amicus
Curiae Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund at 9 n.6, Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (Nos.
99-5 & 99-29) (arguing that domestic violence and rape should not be compared to civil rights
violations because they involve “ conflict in intimate relationships”  rather than “ discrimination” );
Brief Amicus Curiae of Women’s Freedom Network on Behalf of Respondents at 3, Morrison,
120 S. Ct. 1740 (calling the civil rights remedy “ ill-conceived”  and arguing that “ [t]o equate Jim
Crow regimes with whatever subtle bias or societal trends may affect women today is to trivialize
the serious hardships suffered by blacks in the past” ).
193. 120 S. Ct. 1740.
194. Id. at 1763 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“ [G]ender-based violence in the 1990’s was shown
to operate in a manner similar to racial discrimination in the 1960’s.” ).
195. Id. at 1759 (“ Congress’ findings indicate that the problem of discrimination against the
victims of gender-motivated crimes does not exist in all States, or even most States.” ).
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practices, rather than comparing race and gender as abstract legal
categories. In arguing for an analogical relationship between racial assaults
and gender-motivated violence, feminists emphasized the comparable moral
gravity of these attacks but simultaneously articulated important differences
in their social dynamics. Their congressional testimony highlighted the
interrelationship between racial and sexual violence, remaining attentive to
their inseparability in the lives of women of color. Exposing the limitations
of Reconstruction-era remedies for violence, they framed VAWA as a
completion of the nineteenth- and twentieth-century civil rights revolutions.
The race-gender analogy helped to reconfigure rape and domestic violence
as civil rights violations, evoking moral outrage and channeling normative
commitment into a symbolically powerful legal remedy.
Notwithstanding analogical arguments’ considerable utility when
articulated in a nuanced, connective, and context-sensitive manner, the civil
rights remedy’s fate confirms the tendency of legislative and judicial
processes to distort the social meaning and legal consequences of even the
most well-constructed analogies. In the 1970s, the abstraction of Pauli
Murray’s race-sex analogy from its original context compounded the
distortions resulting from the parallel’s incorporation into constitutional
doctrine, where it became a limiting principle under increasingly
conservative political conditions. In the VAWA controversy, the analogy’s
substantive content remained tied to the singular harm of violence
throughout, but legislative and judicial opposition converted the analogy
into a limitation on both the remedial scope and the constitutional
legitimacy of the civil rights remedy. In both instances, the vicissitudes of
legislative and judicial politics transformed what had been a potent
rhetorical weapon against a “ common fate of discrimination”  into a
double-edged sword.
